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Vecino: Boggs v. Boggs

NOTE
BOGGS v. BOGGS: STATE

COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND
SUCCESSION RIGHTS WALLOW IN
ERISA'S MIRE

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 2, 1997, the United States Supreme Court decided
the case of Boggs v. Boggs! and held that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"f preempted
Louisiana community property and succession laws and prohibited the inheritance of a nonemployee spouse's community
interest in pension plan benefits.3 Although the Boggs holding
involved preemption of a claim based on community property
and succession rights, the Court's holding is sufficiently broad
to preempt any state laws that conflict with ERISA4 by providing a predeceasing nonparticipant, nonbeneficiary spouse
with transferable property rights in a participant spouse's pension plan benefits. 5 Accordingly, the participant spouse pos1. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
3. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760-67 (1997).
4. See id. at 1760. The Court stated:
This case involves a community property claim, but our ruling will affect as well the right to make claims or assert interests based on the
law of any State, whether or not it recognizes community property. Our
ruling must be consistent with the congressional scheme to assure the
security of plan participants and their families in every State.
[d.
5. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2336 (West 1996). Article 2336 states that "[elach
spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the community property... " [d.
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sesses exclusive rights to the pension plan assets until death
after which the beneficiaries receive the interest by operation
of federal statute.6 It follows that the non-beneficiary legatees
and heirs of a predeceasing nonparticipant, nonbeneficiary
spouse are unable, either directly or indirectly, to benefit from
any testamentary disposition consisting of pension plan assets
of the participant spouse. 7 Further, this holding extends to
prevent such heirs and legatees from being awarded nonpension property of equivalent value in lieu of the plan assets.8
Under general principles of state community property law, the
Court's holding divests a nonparticipant spouse of a present
ownership right and of testamentary power over an interest in
the community pension plan benefits.9 Thus, the Boggs decision unexpectedly alters an otherwise predictable system of
property ownership and succession under state law and, in its
wake, leaves many married couples with uncertain future estate plans. 10
This Note will summarize the history of Boggs 11 and discuss
the issues that led to a circuit split between the Fifth and
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2346 (West 1996). Article 2346 states "[elach spouse acting
alone may manage, control, or dispose of community property unless otherwise provided by law." Id.
6. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1764-65 (1997).
7. See id.
8. See id. at 1766,1774-75.
9. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 261-62, 459 (1971).
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2336 (West 1996). Article 2336 states:
Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the community property. Nevertheless, neither the community nor the things of
the community may be judicially partitioned prior to the termination of
the regime.
Id.
WILLIAM Q. DE FuNiAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 2D EDITION 459 (1971). Community property law allows each spouse to
transfer his or her community interest to heirs and devisees at death. During marriage, community property law provides for the joint ownership of assets, benefit or
gain, and liability for loss. See id.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2346 (West 1996). Article 2346 states "[elach spouse acting
alone may manage, control, or dispose of community property unless otherwise provided by law." Id.
10. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997).
11. Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996), af!'g, 849 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. La.
1994), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
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Ninth Circuits regarding community property rights and
ERISA protected pension plan benefits in the testamentary
context. 12 . It will also track ERISA's legislative history to determine Congressional intent.13 In particular, this Note will
examine inconsistencies among past judicial constructions
based on the application of ERISA's preemptionI4 and spendthrift I5 provisions to regulate private pension plans.16 Further,
this Note will scrutinize the Court's holding in BoggsI7 giving
deference to the facts in the record to clarify the problems inherent in the majority's questionable reasoning. 18 Finally, this
Note will discuss the broad reach of the BoggsI9 holding in light
of the practical estate planning considerations and resulting
uncertainty now faced by lawyers and plan participants and
spouses in community property states.20 This Note ultimately
suggests a legislative solution to remedy the adverse effects of
the Court's holding in Boggs21 in order to avoid any further federal intrusion upon state granted property ownership and testamentary rights. 22

See infra notes 23-83 and accompanying text.
12. Compare Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996) with Ablamis v. Roper,
937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991).
See infra notes 160-93, 278-91 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 84-159 and accompanying text.
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). This clause states that "[e)xcept as provided ..
. the provisions of this subchapter ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit plan ..." Id.
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1994). This clause applies only to pension plan
benefits and states that "[e)ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under
the plan may not be assigned or alienated." Id.
16. See infra notes 160-309 and accompanying text.
17. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
18. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S.
Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79); Brief for Respondents, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754
(1997) (No. 96-79); Brief for Petitioner, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 9679).
19. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
20. See infra notes 310-70 and accompanying text. See generally, Boggs v. Boggs
Holds That a Predeceasing Nonparticipant Spouse Has No Property Interest in an
ERISA Pension Plan, 6 No.3 ERISA LIT. RPTR. 4 (August, 1997); Philip H. Wile, Boggs
v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997).
21. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
22. See infra notes 371-76 and accompanying legislative proposal text.
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II. BOGGS V. BOGGS 23

A. FACTS
Isaac Boggs, Jr. ("Isaac") was married to his first wife Dorothy Boggs ("Dorothy") when he commenced his employment
with South Central Bell ("BellSouth") in 1949?4 The couple
had three children, Thomas Frank Boggs, Harry Maurice
Boggs and David Bruce Boggs ("the sons"),25 and remained
married until Dorothy's death on August 14, 1979.26
Isaac remarried on April 5, 1980.27 Isaac and his second
wife, Sandra Boggs ("Sandra"), remained married until Isaac's
death on February 16, 1989.28 The couple had no children from
their marriage. 29 Isaac was survived by Sandra and the sons
from his marriage to Dorothy.3o During all relevant times the
marital property at issue was governed by Louisiana community property laws.31
Isaac was employed by BellSouth for thirty-six years until
his retirement in 1985.32 During his employment, he participated in private, voluntarily funded employee benefit plans
("pension plan") governed by ERISA.33 Isaac funded his pension plan with community property; that is, property acquired

23. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
24. See id. at 1758.
25. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 463 (E.n. La. 1994).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1996).
31. See id. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1996). Article 2338 states that
community property includes "property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse." [d.
32. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1997).
33. See Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1996). Brief for Respondents
at 8, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79). The private, voluntary and
community character of the funds used by Isaac to pay into the pension, basically deferred compensation, are "considered fruits of the labor of the community ..." [d.
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by his effort, skill or industry during his thirty year marriage
to Dorothy and his nearly four year marriage to Sandra.34
The pension plan was a "qualified plan,>35 and upon Isaac's
retirement it provided him with the following: (1) a lump-sum
payment from the BellSouth Management Savings Plan which
Isaac "rolled over" into an Individual Retirement Account
("IRA,,);36 (2) a joint and survivor annuity ("Annuity,,);37 (3)
ninety-six shares of AT&T common stock from the BellSouth
Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP,,);38 and (4) a life insurance policy naming Sandra as the designated beneficiary.39
On Dorothy's death, her estate claimed an undivided onehalf interest in all community assets, including Isaac's undistributed pension plan benefits that had accrued up to her date
of death.40 Under Louisiana's community property system,

34. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1997). Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp.
462, 463 (E.D. La. 1994). La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1996). Article 2338 states
that community property includes "property acquired during the existence of the legal
regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse." The plans were primarily
funded with community property from Isaac's marriage to Dorothy as this period consisted of thirty out of the thirty-six years Isaac worked for BellSouth. The funds used
by Isaac to contribute to the pension plan after his remarriage to Sandra were also
community funds because they consisted of property acquired during his marriage to
Sandra. See id.
35. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997). Qualified plans are those in compliance with the requirements of I.R.C. § 401 (1986). As an incentive to create and maintain plans meeting the strict requirements established under the Code, private employer's receive tax
deductions for contributions to such plans under I.R.C. § 404 (1986). Under I.R.C. §
402 (1986) employees participating in qualified plans are not taxed on their contributions, including employer matching benefits received in connection with their participation, until actual receipt of the accrued benefits from the plan. Further, qualified
plan earnings are allowed to accumulate free of income taxes in the trusts used to fund
them under I.R.C. § 501(a) (1986). Pension plans, as opposed to welfare plans, must
have a spendthrift provision to be "qualified" under the Internal Revenue Code. See id.
36. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 463-64 (E.D. La. 1994). The lump-sum
payment of $151,628.94 was rolled over into the IRA which was valued at $180,778.05
on Isaac's death. Isaac made no withdrawals from the IRA during his life. Sandra was
the designated beneficiary of this IRA at Isaac's death. See id.
37. See Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F. 3d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1996). The Annuity provided
monthly payments of $1,777.67 to Isaac from the date of his retirement until his death
with the survivorship benefit continuing in Sandra's favor until her death. See id.
38. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1997).
39. See id.
40. See id.
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Dorothy's estate could claim such an interest even though the
benefits did not become payable until Isaac's retirement because benefits accumulated during the community's existence
constituted an "incorporeal, movable right.,141
In addition, Dorothy bequeathed one-third of her community property estate to Isaac outright and confirmed the remaining two-thirds in his favor as a lifetime usufruct.42 Ultimately, under Louisiana law, the sons would receive naked
ownership43 of the two-thirds usufruct interest on Isaac's

41. T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834, 851 (La. 1976). The court
stated:
The value of the right to share in the retirement ... funds is an incorporeal, movable right. When acquired during the existence of a marriage, the right to share is a community asset which, at the dissolution
of the community, must be so classified - even though at the time acquired or at the time of dissolution of a community, ... the contractual
right to receive money or other benefits is due in the future and is contingent ...
Id.
42. See Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1996). La. Civ. Code Ann.
art. 535 (West 1996). Article 535 states: "Usufruct is a real right oflimited duration on
the property of another. The features of the right vary with the nature of the things
subject to it as consumables or nonconsumables." Id.
Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1997). Usufruct is a Louisiana civil law concept and is roughly the equivalent of a common law life estate. See id.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 538 (West 1996). Article 538 states that, at the termination
of the usufruct, the usufructuary [holder of the usufructl of a consumable is "bound to
pay the naked owner either the value that the things had at the commencement of the
usufruct or deliver to him things of the same quantity or quality." Id.
Brief for Respondents at 9, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79). The
testamentary clause in Dorothy's will states "I give and bequeath the maximum permitted under the law to my beloved husband [Isaacl together with the lifetime usufruct
over the balance." All of Dorothy's property on the date of her death, the date on which
all of her rights are determined for the purposes of this case, was community property.
See id.
Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 463 (E.D. La. 1994). "Pursuant to Dorothy Boggs'
will, Isaac Boggs, Jr. received one-third of her estate [outrightl and the lifetime usufruct of the remaining two-thirds of the estate, whose naked ownership was inherited
by [the sonsl." Id.
43. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 478 (West 1996). Article 478 states: "The ownership ofa thing burdened with a usufruct is designated as naked ownership." Id.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 477 (West 1996). Article 477 states: "Ownership is the right
that confers on a person direct, immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing. The
owner of a thing may use, enjoy, and dispose of it within the limits and under conditions established by law." Id.
Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1767 (1997). Naked ownership is roughly the
equivalent of a common law remainder interest. See id.
Brief for Respondents at 10-11, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79).
The sons were not expressly mentioned in their mother's will and succeed to a portion
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death.44 In addition, under Louisiana succession laws, the sons
were entitled to an accounting to settle their mother's community property interest on their father's death.45 Such an accounting would fIx: the amount of the residue the sons would
receive in the form of the naked ownership interest.46
On his death, Isaac bequeathed a lifetime usufruct47 to Sandra in the property distributed to him from the pension plan
with the naked ownership interest48 again held by the sons.49
Subsequently, controversy arose between Sandra and the sons
over ownership of the pension plan benefIts.50 Sandra claimed
entitlement to Isaac's distributed plan benefIts under ERISA
and the sons claimed entitlement to the naked ownership interest in the benefIts in an amount attributable to their

of her estate by operation of state law pursuant to the interaction between state law
principles of usufruct and naked ownership. See id.
44. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 463 (E.D. La. 1994). MPursuant to Dorothy Boggs' will, Isaac Boggs, Jr. received one-third of her estate [outrightl and the
lifetime usufruct of the remaining two-thirds ofthe estate, whose naked ownership was
inherited by [the sonsl." Id.
45. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 538 (West 1996). See, Comment B regarding the
duty of the usufructuary to render an accounting.
See also, Brief for Respondents at 10-11, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No.
96-79). The MJudgment of Possession" entered in the Succession of Dorothy Boggs (No.
8627) in the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany, State of Louisiana, on February 5, 1980 memorializes the existence of the naked ownership rights
of the heirs according to state community property and succession laws. See id.
Id. at 9. Accordingly, by operation of state law, the sons inherit a portion of their
parents' estates. This portion cannot be decreased or eliminated by the parents except
in certain limited circumstances not present here. The sons' interests, as heirs, vest at
the time of Dorothy's death by operation of Louisiana law. See id.
Id. at 9. A brief explanation of Louisiana community property and succession laws
will help to fully understand the nature of the sons' claims and their interests in the
benefits of their parents' community. Under the ancient law of Mseizin," the sons'
vested rights provided them, by operation of law, with succession to their mother's
community interest inheritance immediately on her death. At this time, the sons were
entitled to possession, subject to their father's lifetime usufruct and distribution of the
plan benefits, without any further court proceedings. See id.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 940 (West 1996). Article 940 states: MA succession is acquired by the legal heir, who is called by law to the inheritance, immediately after the
death of the deceased person to whom he succeeds." Id.
46. See supra notes 42-45.
47. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 535 (West 1996).
48. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 478 (West 1996).
49. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1997).
50. See id.
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mother's community interest. 51 The value of the sons' claim
would be determined through an accounting under Louisiana
community property and succession laws.52 The disputed
amount of the pension plan's value was substantial in relation
to its total because Dorothy was married to Isaac for thirty out
of the thirty-six years he participated in the plan.53 The ultimate dispute arose, however, from the alleged conflict between
ERISA and Louisiana community property and succession laws
as applied to the disposition of the distributed pension plan
benefits. 54
Sandra did not refute Dorothy's community property ownership interest in the pension plan benefits under Louisiana
law. 55 She insisted, however, that ERISA preempted Louisiana
community property law and governed the disposition of Isaac's
distributed pension plan benefits, including the value of Dorothy's community interest therein.56 Sandra relied solely on
ERISA's preemption provision to counter the sons' state law
claims. 57
III.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On Isaac's death, the sons filed an action in Louisiana state
court demanding an accounting of the value of their father's
usufruct to determine the portion of the retirement benefits
traceable to their mother, Dorothy's, community interest.58

51. See id. at 1759.
52. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2369 (West 1996). See Comment B stating Louisiana community property law provides that at the tennination of the community regime, each spouse owes to the other spouse (or when the community is terminated by
the death of the spouse to his or her heirs or legatees), an accounting for community
property under his or her control. (Emphasis added.) See id.
53. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 464 (E.D. La. 1994).
54. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758-59 (1997).
55. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 464 (E.D. La. 1994).
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 33-34, Boggs v. Boggs,
117 S. Ct. 1754,1774 (1997) (No. 96-79). The sons originally sought relief in the fonn
of a percentage portion of the Annuity payments made to Isaac after his retirement and
up to the date of his death, but later stipulated at oral argument that they sought only
an accounting of the same. Such an accounting would provide a valuation of their
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Based on this accounting, the sons sought a judgment awarding them a percentage of the Annuity payments received by
their father, Isaac, during his retirement.59 Pursuant to the
accounting, the sons also sought an award of a percentage of
the Annuity payable to Sandra from the date of Isaac's death in
addition to a percentage of the IRA and a portion of the ESOP
shares. 6o
Pursuant to her rights as a named beneficiary under
ERISA,61 Sandra filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.62 She sought a declaratory judgment that ERISA preempted Louisiana community property law.63 Sandra also sought to establish her ownership rights in the disputed benefits under ERISA and prevent
Louisiana state law from diminishing her ownership interest

mother's community interest in the benefits and Louisiana law would presumably
allow the sons to recover other assets of equivalent value.
See Succession of McVay v. McVay, 476 So.2d 1070, 1073-74 (La. App. 1985). An
IRA containing community assets was not listed as an asset of decedent's estate because there was a designated beneficiary, but the estate was deemed to contain the
equivalent cash value. See id.
Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So.2d 118, 123 (La. 1991). A court may order that "cash or
other property in lieu of an actual percentage of the pension payments" be paid in
equalization of community assets on termination. See id.
59. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 464 <E.D. La. 1994).
60. See id.
But see, United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 33-39, Boggs v. Boggs,
117 S. Ct. 1754, 1774 (1997) (No. 96-79). Referring to the general question and answer
discussion between the Justices and Respondents' counsel regarding the sons' claim
and its relation to the Annuity proceeds both received by Isaac during retirement and
payable to Sandra after his death. The sons stipulated at oral argument that although
they prevailed on the claim for a portion of the survivor's annuity received and payable
to Sandra in the Fifth Circuit they merely sought an accounting for the use of the property. This accounting would determine the portion of the Annuity attributable to their,
mother, Dorothy's community interest and fix their naked ownership award. Id.
6!. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994). This section states:
A civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary ... to recover benefits due to him [or herl under the terms of [thel plan, to enforce his [or herl rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his [or
herl rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan ...

Id.
62. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 464 <E.D. La. 1994).
63. See id.
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by an amount attributable to Dorothy's testamentary disposition. 64
Sandra moved for summary judgment based on her alleged
entitlement to the property under ERISA.65 The parties stipulated to the facts and the district court rejected Sandra's motion and ruled in favor of the sons.66 The district court concluded that ERISA did not preempt Louisiana community
property and succession laws because Congress did not expressly intend ERISA to preempt such state laws that did not
regulate private employee benefit plans within the meaning of
ERISA's preemption provision.67 Since the Louisiana laws at
issue did not directly relate to regulation of private pension
plans within the meaning of ERISA's preemption provision,
such laws did not substantially damage the federal regulatory
interest and ERISA was held not controlling.68
Sandra appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. 69 On April 17, 1996, the Fifth Circuit confirmed the district court's jurisdiction by holding that Sandra
had standing as a beneficiary.70 After de novo review 71 of the
district court's preemption analysis, the appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling.72 The appellate court held
that, despite ERISA's plenary authority in employment benefits law and broad federal preemption power, ERISA did not
preempt Louisiana community property and succession laws

64. See id.
65. See id. at 463.
66. See id.
67. See Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 465 (E.D. La. 1994). Despite its broad
preemption provision, ERISA does not preempt state laws such as Louisiana's community property laws which were not specifically designed to effect ERISA benefit plans.
While such state laws may indirectly implicate an ERISA pension plan, they do not
relate to an employee benefit plan to trigger ERISA's preemption provision. 1d.
68. See id. at 465. "Application of Louisiana's community property law in this
case will not do major damage to any federal interest, and thus, the Supremacy Clause
does not require that the state law be overridden." 1d. at 466.
69. See Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 94 (5th Cir. 1996).
70. See id.
See supra note 61 regarding actions which may be brought and remedies available
under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
71. See Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1996).
72. See id. at 98.
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because the federal interest in regulating pension plans was
not frustrated.73
Judge Wiener, who did not participate in the Fifth Circuit
panel's decision, voiced concern with the appellate court's
holding74 and called for a poll of all active Fifth Circuit
judges.75 Judge Wiener asked to rehear the case en banc based
on the ruling's pervasive economic impact on all pension plan
participants and spouses in their retirement years.76 The ma-

73. See id. Ruling per curiam, Judges Wisdom and Duhe affirmed stating that "a
state community property system that affects what a plan participant does with his
benefits after they are received does not impermissibly intrude on the mandates ERISA
imposes on plan administrators." [d. at 96. Further, the court stated:
This Court concludes that under the facts of this case, the Louisiana
community property law is not sufficiently 'related to' an employee
benefit plan to necessitate ERISA preemption ... Benefits will continue
to be paid to the beneficiary in the manner provided in the plan. A
spouse's accounting obligation under community property law affects
employee benefit plans 'in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral' a manner
to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan. Our decision
relates not to the plan but to the disposition of the proceeds only after
payment to the designated beneficiary.
[d. at 96-97; citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
74. See Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169, 1170-71 (5th Cir. 1996). Judge Wiener was
concerned over the pervasive impact of the majority's holding based on the following
majority observations:
Today, ... the preeminence and importance of pension plans and welfare benefit plans in the lives of most Americans has grown exponentially. With their combined assets totaling over 4.7 trillion dollars, employee benefit plans cover an estimated 54 million employees. In addition to its economic significance, [ERISA) plays a dominant role in
present day jurisprudence as reflected, for example, by the unusually
high number of ERISA cases for which the Supreme Court has granted
writs in recent years. In sum, ERISA and employee benefit plans are
ubiquitous and integral parts of our society.
[d.
75. See id. at 1170.
76. See id.
FED. R APP. P. 35(a) states:
When Hearing or Rehearing in Banc Will Be Ordered: A majority of the
circuit judges who are in regular active service may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en
banco Such a hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not
be honored except (1) when consideration by the full court is necessary
to secure and maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
[d.
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jority of the Fifth Circuit judges, however, refused to rehear the
case. 77
Although Sandra bypassed filing a motion for rehearing en
bane, she appealed the Fifth Circuit's judgment by writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.78 Sandra claimed
that the Fifth Circuit's ruling usurped her rights under ERISA
as the surviving spouse of a pension plan participant.79 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari8o largely due to Fifth and
Ninth Circuit conflict.al The circuits conflicted over whether
ERISA preempted state law that allowed for the testamentary
disposition of a nonparticipant spouse's community property
interest in pension plan benefits after distribution from a qualified plan. 82
On June 2,1997, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Fifth Circuit and held that ERISA preempted Louisiana
community property and succession laws and prohibited operation of state law from effecting the sons' inheritance.83

77. See Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169, 1170 (5th Cir. 1996). Circuit Judge Wiener
dissented to the per curiam opinion's denial of an en banc rehearing. He was joined in
this dissent by Chief Judge Politz and Judges King, Benavides, Stewart and Parker.
78. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (1997).
82. See id.
Compare Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996) with Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.
2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991).
83. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1755, 1759, 1767 (1997). The Justices
ruled seven to two in favor of ERISA preemption of Louisiana state laws allowing for
the testamentary disposition of a nonparticipant spouse's interest in the Annuity. The
Justices ruled five to four in favor of ERISA preemption of the state law testamentary
disposition of all other benefits. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was joined by
Justices Scalia, Souter, Stevens and Thomas. Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting
opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined and Justice Ginsberg and Chief Justice
Rehnquistjoined in part. See id.
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BACKGROUND

A. REGULATION OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS PRIOR TO ERISA
Private pension and welfare plans are relatively modern
economic institutions which have steadily increased in popularity as a means of providing for one's retirement security.84
The growth and development of the private pension system has
been substantial since its inception in the mid-1940's and today
the assets of private employee benefits plans constitute the
largest private accumulation of funds in the United States.85
Congress did not enact federal regulation of private pension
and welfare plans until the enactment of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 ("1958 Act").86 Congress enacted the 1958 Act to protect the rights and interests of plan
participants and their beneficiaries.87 This protection would be
achieved through the plan's required disclosure of information
to the participants and beneficiaries, theoretically, enabling
those parties to monitor the performance of their plans.88 Since
the 1958 Act was primarily a disclosure statute, however, it
lacked an effective enforcement mechanism.89 Thus, under
most circumstances, plan administrators and fiduciaries could
not be held responsible under federal law for any unlawful activity or mismanagement of employee pension funds. 90
In 1962, Congress amended the 1958 Act ("1962 Amendment") to address improper management of plan assets by plan
administrators and fiduciaries. 91 The 1962 Amendment made

84. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 4640 (1973).
85. See id. at 4641.
See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (1997) (the participant residents of the
nine community property states alone have perhaps $1 trillion in private retirement
plans).
86. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 4641 (1973).
87. See id. at 4642.

88.
89.
90.
91.

See id.
See id. at 4641-42.
See id.
See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 4641-42 (1973). Examples of such manage-

rial improprieties included theft and embezzlement of plan assets which caused plans
to lose all of their assets prior to distribution to participants and beneficiaries entitled
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certain acts federal crimes if committed in connection with
pension plan administration and conferred some regulatory
and investigatory authority on the Secretary of Labor.92 Congress intended these changes to provide the Secretary of Labor
with enhanced enforcement power in this area. 93 The 1962
Amendment, however, did not accomplish the regulatory protection that Congress intended because it lacked substantive
fiduciary standards and required only limited disclosure.94 As
a result, the 1962 Amendment continued to be largely ineffective in meeting Congress' primary goal of providing retirement
income securitl5 because continued mismanagement and unsound planning by pension plan administrators and fiduciaries
caused many workers and their dependents to be deprived of
the intended protection. 96
Ineffective federal regulation was further hampered by nonuniform and, often contradictory, state laws that also regulated
employee benefit plans in the state in which the plan was being
administered. 97 State regulation only compounded mismanagement by creating confusion among plan administrators and
fiduciaries due to the non-uniform regulatory schemes.98
B. ERISA's PuRPOSE
In 1974, Congress again recognized that private pension
plans were emerging as the most important vehicle by which
United States workers could provide post-retirement financial
security for themselves, their spouses and their dependents.99

to the lost benefits. Fiduciary improprieties such as these were made punishable as
federal crimes under the 1962 Amendment. See id.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. "Experience in the decade since the passage of the amendments has

demonstrated the inadequacy of the [1958 Act, as amended) in regulating the private
pension system for the purpose of protecting rights and benefits due to workers." [d. at
4642.
96. See H.R. REP. NO. 533, 93d Cong., 4641 (1973).

97. See id.
98. See id. at 4650.
99. See id. at 4641.
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In response to this continually developing trend and public
concern over prior ineffective regulatory control,t°o Congress
enacted ERISA. lol The purpose of ERISA was to establish a
uniform system of law to govern employee benefit plans and
distributions and to protect the rights and interests of plan
participants and their beneficiaries. lo2

Compare Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679 (1997). The two other primary sources of post-retirement economic
subsistence are the benefits received from The Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Program, commonly referred to as social security, and private savings. In
most situations these sources do not provide adequate security for the retired person,
let alone spouses and dependents. This inadequacy has lead to the increased reliance
on benefits from private retirement plans to provide for the means necessary to maintain a standard ofliving as close as possible to one's pre-retirement level. See id.
100. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 4639-43 (1973).
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. 1997). Congress enacted ERISA under
its Commerce Clause powers. The laws enacted under ERISA became effective on
January 1, 1975. See id.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. "Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce .
. . among the several States.' [d.
102. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 4639, 4642, 4647-48 (1973). The report
stated:
The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension
rights ... Underlying the provisions of this Act is the recognition of a
necessity for a comprehensive legislative program dealing not only with
the malfeasance and maladministration in the plans, . . . but . . . in
short, the establishment of certain minimum standards to which all
private pension plans must conform if the private pension promise is to
become real rather than illusory.
[d. at 4639, 4647-48.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994). Section 1001(b) states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting
to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with
respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
courts.
[d.
29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1994). Section 1003(a) states that ERISA's coverage
shall apply to:
[A)ny employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained - (1) by
any employer engaged in commerce or in an industry or activity affecting commerce; or (2) by any employee organization or organizations
representing employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (3) by both.
[d.
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C. ERISA's PREEMPTION PROVISION
Congress expressly intended ERISA to preempt state laws
relating to private employee benefit plans. 103 ERISA's preemption provision enables the statute to effectively and exclusively
regulate private employee benefit plans. 104 This provision
states that" [e]xcept as provided ... the provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit
plan ... ,,105 To further this objective, ERISA sets forth specific
standards and procedures for pension plan administrators to
ensure that participants and beneficiaries receive their benefits. loS Accordingly, the statute requires plan administrators
and fiduciaries to act solely in the interests of participants and
beneficiaries. lo7 Entitlement to plan benefits is based on the
premise that only participantsl08 and their beneficiaries lo9 have
a claim of right to such benefits. llo
ERISA's preemption provision, however, does not specifically indicate an express intent to preempt areas of traditional
state concern not directly related to the regulation of employee
benefit plans. lll The clause is silent on the testamentary dis-

103. See supra note 14 for the text of 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
See also, Brooks v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 903 (1986). Congress enacted
ERISA with broad preemptive powers to ensure the uniformity of pension plan law by
eliminating conflicting state laws. See id.
104. See supra note 102, citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994), for ERISA's stated purpose.
105. See supra note 14 for the text of29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
106. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 4639-40, 4656-59 (1973).
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c)(1994).
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1994). A "participant" is defmed as "any employee or
former employee ... who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from
an employee benefit plan .... " [d.
109. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1994). A "beneficiary" is defmed as one "designated by
a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." [d.
110. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994). Section 1132(a)(1)(B) states:
A civil action may be brought by - (1) a participant or beneficiary ... to
recover benefits due to him [or her) under the terms of [the) plan, to enforce his [or her) rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his [or
her) rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan ...
[d.
111. See supra note 14 for the text of ERISA's preemption provision.
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position of pension plan benefits on the death of a nonparticipant spouse who is the domicilliary of a community property
state. U2
D. ERISA's SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION

ERISA's spendthrift provision prohibits most transfers of
the right to receive pension plan benefits and prevents the assignment and alienation of plan benefits by plan participants
and beneficiaries. 1l3 This provision applies only to pension
plan benefits and states that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide
that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or
alienated."u4 Whether this spendthrift provision prevents the
transfer of such rights solely to unrelated third parties or
whether it also bars the apportionment of pension plan benefits
to nonemployee spouses or to their estates and heirs on death
has been a subject of judicial debate. u5 The Boggs holding prevents the estate of a nonemployee spouse from claiming a
community interest in pension plan benefits and is sufficiently
broad to have settled this debate regarding the meaning of
ERISA's spendthrift provision. u6
E. PREEMPI'ION, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND ERISA's SILENT
STRENGTH

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
vests Congress with the power to enact legislation to establish
areas of exclusive federal control and to preempt the states'

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). ERISA's preemption provision
should be read to have a pre-emptive reach as broad as its language in that "[aJ law
'relates to' [under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)J an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of
the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." Id.
112. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). This clause states that "[eJxcept as provided ..
. the provisions of this subchapter ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit plan ..." Id.
113. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(l) (1994).

114. Id.
115. See Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996). The court held in favor of state
community property and succession laws. See id.
But see, Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991). The court held in favor of
ERISA preemption of state community property law in the testamentary context. See
id.

116. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1765-66 (1997).
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power to legislate within those areas.ll7 Thus, despite the substantive nature of state marital property and succession laws,
Congress has the constitutional power to preempt such laws by
direct legislative action118 limiting a state's authority over the
property rights of its domicilliaries. ll9 To find in favor of federal statutory preemption, however, courts must determine
that federal and state laws conflict and that Congress clearly
intended the usurpation· of state law.120 Where ambiguityexists, this determination must weigh the nature of the state interest against the goals of the federallegislation.l21
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA's
preemption provision broadly with respect to the provision's
inherent preemptive power in finding that ERISA preempts

117. See U.S. CONST. art.VI, c1.2. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby;
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
[d.
Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1459 (9th Cir. 1991); citing, as authority, Ridgway v.
Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1981). State family property laws that conflict with federallaws will be overridden pursuant to the Supremacy Clause because:
The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material
where there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our
Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail ... That principle is but the necessary consequence of the Supremacy Clause of our
National Constitution.
[d.
See also, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Any state law contrary to a law of Congress is invalidated by the Supremacy Clause. [d.;
Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981).
The Court must find for preemption where state law conflicts with Congressionallegislation validly enacted pursuant to its Constitutional powers. [d.
118. See supra note 117.
119. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1962). The Court held that Federal law
preempted a conflicting state law in the determination of joint ownership rights to
United States savings bonds. See id.
120. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1990) (discussion of Congressional intent regarding the enforcement of ERISA's preemptive powers and fmding
that Congress intended to ensure that only federal law governed pension plans).
See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,525-26 (1977) (Congress' intent to legislate within a particular sphere reflects intent to preempt all state laws in that field).
121. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1990).
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state law in most areas of debate.122 ERISA's broadly stated
preemption provision123 ensures an equally broad application
by the courts in reaction to a conflict with state laws that effectively regulate qualified pension plans.124 However, the provision is silent as to its application to state community property
laws that do not specifically relate to regulating such plans.125
In judicial decisions, state community property laws have
been preempted by ERISA or held to control dependent upon
the state law connection with or relation to the federallegislation's purpose. 126 The United States Supreme Court has held
that state law must do major damage to clear and substantial

122. See Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137-39 (1990) (Congress intended ERISA's preemption provision to be interpreted broadly and past decisions by
the Court applied preemption to prevent conflicts between federal and state regulation
of pension plans in a wide variety of circumstances). See id.
123. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). This clause states that "[e1xcept as provided ..
.the provisions of this subchapter ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit plan ...." [d.
124. See Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1996). The Boggs Court, citing
Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 781 (5th Cir. 1994), stated that "[c10urts
recognize the 'deliberately expansive language chosen by Congress.'" [d.
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990). Congress intended ERISA's preemption provision as a means of ensuring that only one body of law would govern employee
benefit plans - "[t10 require plan providers to design their programs in an environment
of differing state regulations would complicate the administration of nationwide plans,
producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased benefits." [d.
125. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). ERISA's preemption provision contains no express reference to state community property laws. See id.
126. See Free v. Bland 369 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1962). Treasury regulations providing
for the survivor's ownership of United States savings bonds preempt conflicting state
law; despite the fact that the bonds were purchased with community funds. See id.
But see, Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 835-36
(1988). The Court held that Congress did not intend to preempt state law garnishment
of an ERISA welfare benefit, even though the purpose of the garnishment was to collect
a judgment against a plan participant. See id.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739-40 (1985). The Court
held that state laws requiring minimum coverage in insurance policies purchased by
employee plans regulated by ERISA were not preempted because the state law regulates insurance and, thus, is expressly exempt by ERISA See id.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994). The exception to ERISA's preemption clause relied
on by the Metropolitan Court states that nothing in ERISA "shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance ...."

[d.
Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1276 (6th Cir. 1991).
This court held against preemption because the state law's effect on the ERISA governed plan was too remote. See id.
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federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand
that the state law be preempted. 127
Generally, courts have applied one of three theories to resolve conflict between federal and state law. l28 Under the prohibited relation theory, ERISA preempts all state laws that
include a reference to ERISA governed plans due to the obvious
regulatory conflict. 129 Under the prohibited connection theory,
ERISA preempts all conflicting state laws, even those consistent with its own goals. 130 Under the tangential relation theory, however, courts have held that ERISA does not preempt
state laws which have "merely tenuous, remote or peripheral"
effects on qualified benefit plans because the state law impact
does not rise to the level of a conflict.l31 Thus, the Court has
recognized that preemption is not warranted where a state law
tangentially conflicts with ERISA.132 In addition, the Court
has prohibited preemption where ERISA's language is silent on
a state procedural matter. 133

127. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966).
128. See infra notes 129-31.
129. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). ERISA's preemption
provision should be read to have a pre-emptive reach as broad as its language in that
"[allaw 'relates to' [under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)1 an employee benefit plan, in the normal
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." Id.
130. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
("The pre-emption provision was intended to displace all state laws that fall within its
sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements. ").
131. Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1276 (6th Cir.
1991).
132. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983). Citing, as authority,
AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979), the Court refused to preempt a state
garnishment law providing for satisfaction of alimony and child support awards. See
id.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1989); cert. denied 493
U.S. 811 (1989). State laws survived preemption because they were laws of "general
application - often traditional exercises of state power or regulatory authority - whose
effect on ERISA plans is incidental." Id.
133. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 835-838
(1988). The Court upheld application of a state garnishment law to ERISA governed
welfare plan benefits because ERISA was silent on state garnishment procedures. See
id.
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F.

PROPERTY OWNERSHIP PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY
PROPERTY MARITAL REGIMES

Nine states apply the community property system to ownership of property between husband and wife. 134 The primary
goal of the present community property systems is equal
treatment of the spouses by regarding marriage as a partnership to which both members contribute equally.135 Under this
system, property rights are determined by the manner and
timing of the property's acquisition. 13G The community consists
of all property acquired through the skill or efforts of either
spouse during marriage. 137 Generally, community property law
provides each spouse ~ith present ownership of an undivided

134. See WILLIAM Q. DE FuNlAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 1 (1971). The community property states comprising the minority are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas
and Washington. These states have adopted community property principles with origins traceable to variations of the Spanish community property regime. See id.
W.S. McCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAw IN THE UNITED STATES - 1992
SUPPLEMENT 310 (1982 & SUPP. 1992). Wisconsin adopted the Uniform Marital Property Act in 1984 to be effective January I, 1986. See id.
135. See WILLIAM Q. DE FuNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 2-3 (1971). The authors state:
Equality is the cardinal precept of the community property system. At
the foundation of this concept is the principle that all wealth acquired
by the joint efforts of the husband and wife shall be common property;
the theory of the law being that, with respect to marital property acquisitions, the marriage is a community of which each spouse is a member,
equally contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the property after dissolution.
[d.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2325 (West 1996). Article 2325 states that a matrimonial regime creates a system of property ownership and management
between married persons and toward third persons. See id.
136. See WILLIAM Q. DE FuNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 2 (1971). "All property which [the spouses) possess
is presumed to be held and owned by them in common unless or until it is proved to be
the separate property of one of them." Thus, property acquired during the union is
presumed to be community property. (Emphasis added.) "This presumption has generally been continued in our community property states as to property possessed or
acquired during the marriage or in possession of the spouses at the time of the dissolution of the marriage .... " [d. at 117.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1996). Article 2338 states that community property includes "property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the
effort, skill, or industry of either spouse ...." [d.
137. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1996).
See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 2D EDITION 2 (1971).
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one-half interest in the property of the community.138 Both
spouses possess the testamentary power to transfer their respective half of the community at death. l39
All property acquired during marriage, except that acquired
by gift, inheritance, bequest or devise is presumed to be community property irrespective of individual contribution.t 4o
Property acquired before marriage is presumed to be the separate property of each spouse. l4l Generally, title is not determinative of ownership of property acquired during marriage.t 42
Thus, what may appear to be the separate property of one
spouse, is generally presumed to be community property until
the presumption is rebutted. 143
,.

138. See id. at 261-62.
See also, La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2336 (West 1996). Article 2336 states:
Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the community property. Nevertheless, neither the community nor the things of
the community may be judicially partitioned prior to the termination of
the regime. During the existence of the community property regime,
the spouses may, without court approval, voluntarily partition the
community property in whole or part. In each case, the things that
each spouse acquires are separate property.
Id.
139. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 459 (1971). Community property law allows each
spouse to transfer his or her community interest to heirs and devisees at death. See id.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2346 (West 1996). Article 2346 states that "[elach spouse
acting alone may manage, control, or dispose of community property unless otherwise
provided by law." Id.
140. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 117-20 (1971).
141. See id. at 2, 129-31.
142. See id. at 117-19.
See Nilson v. Sarment, 96 P. 315 (Cal. 1908). The presumption that property acquired during marriage is community property, despite title ownership in one spouse's
name, is rebuttable. However, if the presumption is not rebutted, the property is considered community property. See id.
143. See Nilson v. Sarment, 96 P. 315 (Cal. 1908).
See Loutnitsky v. Loutnitsky, 266 P.2d 910, 914 (Cal. 1954). Under some circumstances, title taken in the one spouse's name may be sufficient to rebut the presumption, however, title taken in such a manner does not conclusively establish separate
ownership rights. See id.
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During marriage, spouses may transmute l44 community assets into the separate property of either spouse, or vice-versa,
to defeat or reinforce the community property presumption, as
desired. 145 Transmutation is accomplished by either declaring
certain assets to be separate property or community property
or agreeing to voluntarily partition community property, in
whole or in part. 146 Generally, a writing specifically memorializing the spouses' intent to change the characterization of
specified property is required. 147
G. THE RETIREMENl' EQUITY ACT OF 1984148 AND THE
QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER

149

Congress initially responded to conflicts between ERISA
and state property and domestic relations laws by amending
ERISA under the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 ("REA").150
Specifically, REA addressed ERISA's failure to recognize the
property rights of the nonemployee spouse or dependent chil-

144. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 2D
COLLEGE EDITION (1984). Defmition of transmute: "to change from one form ... into
another; transfonn; convert." ld.
145. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2336 (West 1996). Article 2336 states: "During
the existence of the community property regime, the spouses may, without court approval, voluntarily partition the community property in whole or part. In each case,
the things that each spouse acquires are separate property." ld.
146. See WILLIAM Q. DE FuNIAK AND MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2D EDITION 116 (1971).
147. See id.
148. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, PUB.L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984). This
amendment to ERISA applies to plan years after December 31, 1984. ld. at 1451.
149. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (1994). "[Tlhe tenn 'qualified domestic relations
order' means a domestic relations order - which creates or recognizes the existence of
an alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or
a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan ...." ld.
150. ld.
S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2547 (1984). Congress directed its attention to the equitable resolution of marital dissolution and dependent support issues with respect to
the disposition of ERISA plan benefits. See id.
See also, Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740,748-49 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.,
Seafarer's Union v. Stone, 453 U.S. 922 (1981). The Court refused preemption of state
community property laws which awarded a divorced wife of a participant an interest in
her husband's ERISA regulated pension plan. See id.
But see, Francis v. United Tech. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978). The court
held in favor of preemption in a divorce centered context which prevented state community property law from permitting attachment of plan benefits for family support
purposes. See id. at 87-88.
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dren on termination of the marriage through divorce by creating the qualified domestic relations order. l5l Accordingly, REA
includes a statutory exception to ERISA's spendthrift provision
designated as the qualified domestic relations order
("QDRO,,)152 that is primarily designed to protect the nonemployee spouse's economic interest in pension plan benefits on
divorce. 153 A QDR0 154 protects the right of an alternate payee,
a third party that is neither a pension plan participant nor a
named beneficiary but is often the nonemployee spouse, to receive ERISA regulated plan benefits payable to a participant or
beneficiary under a plan. 155
REA established guidelines for plan administrators to follow
in determining whether this limited exception to the spend-

151. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1991).
S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2565 (1984). "There is a divergence of opinion among
the courts as to whether ERISA preempts State community property laws insofar as
they relate to the rights of a married couple to benefits under a pension, etc., plan."
[d., citing, as authority, Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub
nom., Seafarer's Union v. Stone, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
But see, Francis v. United Tech. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
See also, Brief for Estate Planning Trust and Probate Law Section of the State Bar
of California as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S.
Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79). The divergence of opinion among the courts regarding
ERISA preemption of state community property laws recognized by Congress in the
record cites the Stone and Francis cases as the only specific examples of this divergence. Both of these cases involved a determination of ERISA preemption of spousal
community property rights exclusively within the divorce context. Thus, by the evidence in the Congressional legislative record, the debate Congress sought to settle
through the enactment of REA was purely within the context of marriage dissolution
by divorce. Debate concerning conflicting testamentary rights bestowed on nonparticipant spouses under ERISA and state community property and succession laws was not
recognized and had yet to become an issue of divergent opinion among the courts.
Based purely on the cited evidence of Stone and Francis in the record as Congress'
basis for amending ERISA, there was no actual "divergence" at the time REA was
being discussed and drafted since the Stone decision in effect overruled the Francis
holding because it came down roughly two years later and was issued by the circuit
court, a superior judicial body. See id.
152. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (1994). ERISA's spendthrift provision shall not apply to qualified domestic relations orders. See id.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(1) (1994). "[Tlhe term 'qualified domestic relations order' means a domestic relations order - which creates or recognizes the existence of an
alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a
portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan ..." [d.
153. See supra note 150-51 regarding the purposes of enacting REA.
154. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(1) (1994).
155. See id.
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thrift provision applies. 156 Though Congress did not enact REA
to apply community ownership to pension plan benefits, the
text of REA contains terms suggesting that it utilizes community property principles. 157 Congress, however, enacted REA
primarily to provide the legislative framework within which to
equitably distribute pension plan benefits between participant
and nonparticipant spouses on divorce. l58 Congress did not
intend to directly apply principles of community ownership but
created the QDRO to allow for equitable marital property division on dissolution based on a state divorce decree. 159
H. ERISA IN THE COURTS - CIRCUITS SPLIT

The Court granted certiorari in Boggs I60 primarily because
the Federal Fifth and Ninth Circuits were split on issues related to state community property and testamentary rights under ERISA. 16I The split was created when the Fifth Circuit
upheld the testamentary disposition of a community interest in
ERISA pension plan benefits in accordance with Louisiana
community property and succession laws in Boggs v. Boggs. 162
.The Fifth Circuit's decision was contrary to the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in Ablamis v. Roperl63 which held in favor of ERISA preemption of California community property laws on similar, yet

156. See S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2565 (1984). "In order to provide rational
rules for plan administrators, the committee believes it is necessary to establish guidelines for determining whether the exception to the spendthrift rules applies." [d.
157. See id. at 2547. Congress' purpose in enacting REA is "to improve the delivery
of retirement benefits and provide for greater equity under private pension plans for
workers and their spouses and dependents by taking into account changes in work
patterns, the status of marriage as an economic partnership, and the substantial contribution to that partnership of spouses who work both in and outside the home . .." (Emphasis added.) [d.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
161. See id. at 1759. "The reasoning and holding of the Fifth Circuit's decision
[Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996)] is in substantial conflict with the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th
Cir. 1991) ... [T]he division between the Circuits is significant ...." The Court attributed the significance to the community property systems in place within seven states
in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits combined. See id.
162. Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 98 (5th Cir. 1996).
163. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th eir. 1991).
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distinguishable, facts. l64 Ultimately, in Boggs/65 the United
States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and, in effect,
affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling. 166 The Boggs l67 Court held
that ERISA preempted Louisiana community property and
succession laws. l68 This holding prevented the heirs' inheritance of a nonemployee spouse's community interest in pension
plan benefits. 169 The Court reasoned that Congress intended
ERISA to preempt such laws in areas of traditional state legislative concern/70 thereby, preempting Louisiana state law
from governing the testamentary disposition of community
property.l71
1. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CASE - ABLAMIS V. ROPER l72

Ablamisl73 is the leading case cited by the Boggs174 Court
involving ERISA preemption of state community property law
in a testamentary context.175 In Ablamis, the Ninth Circuit
held that ERISA preempted California community property
law that provided a predeceasing nonparticipant spouse with a
testamentary power over a community interest in the participant spouse's plan benefits. 176 Preemption of state community

164. See id. at 1460
165. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1767 (1997).
166. See id.
167. [d.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968). "The several States ...have
traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates." [d.
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 117 S. Ct.
832, 838 (1997), quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
When considering preemption, the Court assumes "that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." [d.
171. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
172. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991).
173. [d.
174. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (1997).
175. See id.
176. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450,1452 (9th Cir. 1991). The court stated:
We are asked to decide here whether a wife who dies while her husband
is still living may leave half of his current or future pension benefits to
a third party in her will. We hold that an employee whose pension interests are covered by ERISA may not be divested of his entitlement.

[d.
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property and succession laws in Ablamis prohibited the distribution of benefits directly to third parties who were neither
participants nor beneficiaries under the terms of the pension
plan. 177 The court reasoned that holding in favor of state law
would have contravened Congress' intent to provide a stream of
income to the participant survivor during life.178 In upholding
preemption, the Ablamis court ruled against the highest courts
of three community property states.179 Each of these high state
courts provided the nonparticipant spouse with testamentary
control over a community property share of the participant
spouse's pension plan benefits or accounts consisting of distributed plan proceeds. 180
The facts of Ablamis concerned a married couple whose
marital property was subject to California community property
laws. 18l Roger and Glee Ablamis ("Mr. Ablamis" and "Ms.
Ablamis") were married from August 6, 1972 until Ms.
Ablamis' death on February 1, 1988. 182 On Ms. Ablamis death,
Mr. Ablamis was a vested participant in employee benefit
profit sharing plans subject to ERISA regulation. 183 Mr.
Ablamis participated in the plans throughout the duration of
the marriage. l84

177. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450,1455 (9th Cir. 1991).
178. See id. at 1457, 1459. The majority's opinion, in its closing paragraph, states
that this distinction makes no difference because, under operation of state law, the
sons' claims are based on the theory that their interest is derived from the undistributed benefits. See id.
179. See Brief for Estate Planning Trust and Probate Law Section of the State Bar
of California as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct.
1754 (1997) (No. 96-79).
Estate of MacDonald, 794 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1990) (the predeceased nonparticipant
spouse was allowed testamentary control over a community property interest in distributed pension plan benefits deposited into IRA accounts).
Allard v. Frech, 754 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1988) (the predeceased nonparticipant
spouse's estate was held to include community property interest in the participant
spouse's retirement plan benefits).
Farver v. Department of Retirement Sys., 644 P.2d 1149 (Wash. 1982) (pensions are
subject to state community property laws).
180. See supra note 179.
181. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991).
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
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On her death, Ms. Ablamis' will left the majority of her estate "including [her] one-half (112) community property interest
in all community assets" to two trustS. 185 One trust was for the
direct benefit of her children from a previous marriage and the
other trust was for Mr. Ablamis' lifetime maintenance with the
remainder interest passing to the same children.186 On her
death, Ms. Ablamis' estate claimed a community property interest in Mr. Ablamis' vested rights in the pension plan benefits. 187 Whereupon, the trustee of the plan filed a summary
judgment motion seeking declaratory relief prohibiting Ms.
Ablamis' estate from entitlement to any interest in Mr.
Ablamis' pension benefits. lss The executrix of Ms. Ablamis'
estate filed a cross motion for summary judgment claiming entitlement to the estate's statutory one-half community property
interest in Mr. Ablamis' pension benefits.189 The trustee's
claim was based on ERISA preemption of conflicting state law,
while the estate claimed entitlement to the pension plan benefits under California community property laws. 190
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the plan trustee and held that ERISA preempts California
community property laws to the extent that the state laws alIowa nonparticipant spouse to bequeath a community property
interest in the participant spouse's pension plan benefits.l91
The executrix of the estate appealed and the Ninth Circuit held
that ERISA preempted state community property laws and
prohibited a predeceasing nonparticipant spouse from possessing a testamentary interest in the fully vested pension
benefits, current or prospective, of a surviving participant
spouse. 192 Further, the Ninth Circuit held that state court probate orders effecting testamentary transfers were not QDROs

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See id.
See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991).
See id. at 1460 (9th Cir. 1991).
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and, thus, were not excepted from ERISA's spendthrift provision. 193

v. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF
BOGGS v. BOGGS

ERISA's preemption provision states that "[e]xcept as provided ... the provisions of this subchapter ... shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereinafter
relate to any employee benefit plan ... "194 The United States
Supreme Court, however, did not interpret the meaning of the
"relate to" element within the text ERISA's preemption provision. 195 Instead, the Court applied conventional preemption
principles to find preemption of Louisiana community property
laws because the state laws conflicted with ERISA's purpose.1OO
In support of its holding, the Court found that testamentary
transfers allowed under Louisiana law could effectively reduce
the amount payable under the Annuity to below the statutory
minimum 197 thereby frustrating ERISA's purpose of providing
a stream of income to the surviving spouse. 198 The Court held
that ERISA preempted Louisiana state law and denied the
sons' claims to any interest in the distributed benefits.l99

193. See id. at 1459-60.
194. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).

195. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760-61 (1997).
We can begin, and in this case end, the analysis by simply asking if
state law conflicts with the provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate
its objects. We hold that there is a conflict, which suffices to resolve
the case. We need not inquire whether the statutory phrase 'relate to'
provides further additional support for the pre-emption claim.
[d.
196. See id. at 1760-62 (1997). The Court stated that "conventional pre-emption
principles require pre-emption of state law 'where compliance with both federal and
state law is a physical impossibility ... or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of Congress.'" [d. at
1762; citing Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
197. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d)(l) (1994). The survivor's annuity shall not be less
than 50% of the annuity which is payable during Ule joint lives of the participant and
spouse. See id.
198. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1762 (1997). "In the face of this direct
clash between state law and ERISA's provisions and objectives, the state law cannot
stand." [d.
199. See id. at 1767.
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A. CASES DECIDED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE
200
RETIREMENT EQUITY ACT OF 1984 ARE No LONGER
APPLICABLE

Maintaining that Congress enacted ERISA with the primary goals of providing uniform legislation and protecting the
rights of plan participants and their beneficiaries, the majority
opinion identified specific instances in which Louisiana law
conflicted with ERISA's purposes.201 The Court reasoned that
ERISA cases decided prior to the enactment of REA202 allowing

200. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, PUB.L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984). This
amendment to ERISA applies to plan years after December 31, 1984. See id. at 1451.
201. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1762 (1997). Speaking of the specific conflicts, the Court stated:
ERISA's solicitude for the economic security of surviving spouses would
be undermined by allowing a predeceasing spouse's heirs and legatees
to have a community property interest in the survivor's annuity. Even
a plan participant cannot defeat a nonparticipant surviving spouse's
statutory entitlement to such an annuity.
Id.
Id. at 1763. ~ERISA confers pension plan beneficiary status on a nonparticipant spouse only to the extent that a survivor's annuity is required in
covered plans. A qualified domestic relations order awards a spouse, dependent, or alternate payee an interest in a participant's benefits." Id.
Id. at 1764. "The sons are neither participants nor beneficiaries . . . [and their]
claims are based on Dorothy Boggs' attempted testamentary transfer, not on a designation by Isaac Boggs or under the terms ofthe retirement plans." Id.
202. For cases decided before the enactment of REA, see In Re Marriage of Campa,
89 Cal. App. 3d 113 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v.
Campa, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (the nonparticipant spouse's rights in and to pension plan
benefits are not barred by ERISA's spendthrift provision because they are not derived
from a transfer within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) and the appeal was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds for want of a substantial federal question).
Carpenter's Pension Trust for Southern Cal. v. Kronschnabel, 632 F.2d 745, 748-49
(9th Cir. 1980). The court stated:
[A] summary dismissal [by the Supreme Court] for want of a substantial federal question, fully binds the lower courts. The Campa appeal
definitively presented the question whether ERISA preempts statecourt orders directing a pension plan to pay a community property
share of a participant's monthly benefits to his or her ex-spouse. The
Supreme Court has answered that question in the negative.
Id.
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974); United Ass'n. of Journeyman v.
Myers, 488 F. Supp. 704, 712-13 (M.D. La. 1980). Louisiana's community property
laws were not preempted by ERISA's spendthrift provision because community property rights are essentially ownership rights and not transfers under state law, thus
precluding the rmding of an unlawful assignment or alienation in violation of ERISA.
The court used state law marital property characterization due to ERISA's silence on
the matter and concluded that, in the absence of Congress' express intent to control,
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for a spousal community property interest in employment plan
benefits, were no longer applicable.203 The Court reasoned that
Congress specifically preempted the future application of those
holdings 204 by amending ERISA's spendthrift provision pursuant to REA. 205
B. ERISA PREEMPrS LOUISIANA COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND
SUCCESSION LAWS

The Court characterized ERISA's silence on the testamentary rights of nonparticipant spouses to pension plan benefits
as support for its conclusion that such rights are nonexistent
even after the benefits are distributed in accordance with
ERISA. 206 The majority then denied the sons' claims because
they were neither participants207 nor beneficiaries. 208 Their
alleged interest was derived from Louisiana community property and succession laws that created their mother's right to
dispose of her interest in the plan benefits.209 In effect, the
Court held that Dorothy had no testamentary power over her
state law community interest in the pension plan.210 While

state community property rights must prevail. United Ass'n. of Journeyman, 488 F.
Supp. at 712·13
203. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1764·65 (1997). Congress enacted REA
with the QDRO exception to provide enhanced protection to nonparticipant spouses
and children in the event of divorce and, aside from that provision, nonparticipants
who are not designated beneficiaries cannot achieve beneficiary status by reason of
marriage or the nature of their dependence. See id.
204. See supra note 202 for the preempted holdings.
205. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1764·65 (1997).
206. See id. at 1763·64 (1997); citing Massachusetts Mut. Life Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 147·48 (1985).
207. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1764 (1997).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1994). A "participant" is defmed as "any employee or former
employee ...who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an
employee benefit plan .... " [d.
208. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1764 (1997).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1994). A "beneficiary" is defmed as one "designated by a par·
ticipant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to
a benefit thereunder." [d.
209. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1765 (1997).
210. See id. "[I)t would be inimical to ERISA's purposes to allow testamentary reo
cipients to acquire a competing interest in undistributed pension benefits, which are
intended to provide a stream of income to participants and their beneficiaries." Id.
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recognizing the strength of the state interest in the property
rights of its domicilliaries,2l1 the Court found that the state law
disposition of Dorothy's community interest directly conflicted
with ERISA's spendthrift provision?12 As such, the state law
testamentary disposition constituted a prohibited transfer of
pension plan benefits. 213
The Court's ruling preempted the sons' claims to each type
of benefit: the IRA, the Annuity and the ESOP?14 Regarding
the Annuity, the Court found that ERISA mandates pension
plans to provide a qualified joint and survivor annuity payable
to the participant during life and then to the surviving spouse
of a predeceasing participant.215 Thus, a predeceasing nonparticipant spouse has no interest or rights in the annuity.216 BeGuidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990).
ERISA's spendthrift provision "reflects a considered congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners (and their dependents) ..." [d.
211. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (1997). The Court stated:
This case lies at the intersection of ERISA pension law and state community property law. None can dispute the central role community
property laws play in the nine community property States. It is more
than a property regime. It is a commitment to the equality of the husband and wife and reflects the real partnership inherent in the marital
relationship . . . . Louisiana's community property laws, and the community property regimes enacted in other States, implement policies
and values lying within the traditional domain of the States. These
considerations inform our pre-emption analysis.
[d.
Brief for Estate Planning Trust and Probate Law Section of the State
Bar of California as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Boggs v.
Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79). "The almost 80 million residents
in the nine community property jurisdictions have as much as one trillion
dollars in qualified retirement plans." [d.
212. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1765 (1997).
213. See id.
214. See id. at 1764.
215. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1994). "Each pension plan to which this section applies shall provide that - (1) in the case of a vested participant who retires under the
plan, the accrued benefit payable to such participant shall be provided in the form of a
qualified joint and survivor annuity ...." [d.
29 U.S.C. § 1055(d) (1994). Section 1055(d) states that a qualified joint and survivor
annuity is an annuity payable from accrued benefits to a plan participant for life then
to the surviving nonparticipant spouse after death in an amount that is"not less than
50 percent of (and is not greater than 100 percent 00 the amount of the annuity which
is payable during the joint lives of the participant and the spouse ...." [d.
Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (1997). ·Congress' concern for surviving nonparticipant spouses is also evident from the expansive coverage of § 1055 ... [because]
as a general matter [it applies to] ... all pension plans ...." [d.
216. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1762 (1997).
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cause Sandra, Isaac's surviving spouse, neither waived her
rights to the Annuity nor consented to the naming of another
beneficiary she was entitled to all of the survivor's benefits under ERISA. 217
The Court then examined the remammg disputed
benefits.21B The Court held that the interests of pension plan
participants and beneficiaries are entitled to absolute protection and payment of benefit distributions must be made only to
plan participants or beneficiaries.219 Despite the fact that the
sons' claims were brought against Sandra and not directly
against the pension plan itself, the Court refused to allow them
any recovery.220
Accordingly, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit by finding
that the sons had no interest in the pension plan benefits because their mother had no testamentary right over any portion
of that property.221 The sons' petition for rehearing was

217. See id. at 1761. Provision of the survivor's annuity may not be waived by the
participant, absent certain limited circumstances, unless the spouse consents in writing to the designation of another beneficiary. See id.
29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2) (1994). In regards to the nonparticipant spouse's consent to
an alternate beneficiary designation, Section 1055(c)(2) states that such a designation
"cannot be changed [subsequently) without further spousal consent, witnessed by a
plan representative or a notary public." [d.
218. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1762 (1997). The remaining benefits consisted of the IRA, the ESOP shares and a percentage of the monthly annuity payments
made to Isaac during his retirement. See id.
219. See id. at 1765. Congress has provided specific and limited exceptions to
ERISA where it intended to alter the statutory framework.
Assets of a plan are held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries ... Reading ERISA to permit nonbeneficiary interests, even if not enforced against the plan, would result
in troubling anomalies . . . Congress intended to pre-empt [the sons')
nonbeneficiary, nonparticipant interests . . . by the pension plan antialienation provision. The Court further stated that "Dorothy's 1980
testamentary transfer, which is the source of the [sons') claimed ownership interest is a prohibited 'assignment or alienation'.

[d.
26 CFR § 1.401(a) - 13(c)(1)(ii). An assignment and alienation has been defmed as
"any direct or indirect arrangement whereby a party acquires from a participant or
beneficiary" an interest enforceable against a plan to "all or any part of a plan benefit
which is, or may become, payable to the participant or beneficiary." [d.
220. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1766-1767 (1997).
221. See id. at 1767.
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denied. 222 The Court then remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to vacate the district court's order ruling in favor of the
sons and enter judgment in accordance with the Supreme
Court's opinion. 223
VI.

CRITIQUE

The issue in this case was whether state community property and succession laws determined testamentary rights in
community property consisting of qualified pension plan benefits or had Congress intended ERISA to provide the conclusive
solution in determining ownership of such property.224 When
considering preemption of laws in an area of traditional state
legislative concern, such as community property and succession
laws, Congress and the courts should give deference to the
strong state interest. 225 Within ERISA or its legislative history, Congress does not provide an express intention to supersede state community property and succession laws?26 Where

222.
223.
224.
225.

See
See
See
See

Boggs v. Boggs, 118 S. Ct. 9, 10 (1997).
Boggs v. Boggs, 121 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 1997).
Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1758 (1997).
In Re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). "The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
States not to the laws of the United States." [d.
.
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581, 593 (1979). The Court held that the
nonemployee spouse was not entitled to a community share of railroad retirement
benefits because the Railroad Retirement Act preempted state community property
law, but cautioned that family law belongs to the states and courts have limited review
in determining whether or not to preempt state law. The Hisquierdo Court was hesitant
to fmd preemption, but found it necessary to prevent infringement of a federal right by
a state community property law because conflict between the two involved the allocation of an entitlement to federal benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act. See id. at
581,590.
But see, Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 591-96 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating the importance of respecting the tradition of state property law because of the strength of the state interest and asserting the nonemployee spouse's
present ownership rights).
226. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994). Section 1001(b) states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting
to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with
respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
courts.
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preemption is at issue and Congress has not expressed an intention to preempt state law, the courts must find conflict between state and federal law before federal law can provide a
constitutionally conclusive settlement.227
Although the Boggs Court relied on a standard conflict preemption analysis, the proper focus in determining whether conflict exists between federal and state law in the context of
Boggs is an analysis based on the statutory language and
meaning of ERISA's preemption and spendthrift provisions.228

A. THE COURT'S QUESTIONABLE ANALYSIS
The Boggs majority ignored inquiry into the meaning of
ERISA's preemption provision and stated that it need only rely
on basic conflict preemption principles to resolve all issues.229
The Boggs holding established Sandra's ownership of the pension plan benefits and preempted the sons' claims largely based
on what the Court characterized as a conflict between Doro-

Id.
Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
35, 52-53 (Winter, 1996). The article states that, with regard to the legislative history of ERISA's preemption provision, the House Bill proposed preemption of state laws that relate to reporting, disclosure, fiduciary duties,
and funding and vesting matters; while the Senate Bill proposed preemption of state laws that relate to the subject matters regulated by ERISA.
The preemption provision, as enacted, was the product of the Conference
Committee's revision roughly a few weeks prior to the January 1, 1975 enactment of ERISA. See id.
227. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme.
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.
228. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1769 (1997).
229. See id. at 1762. "Conventional conflict pre-emption principles require preemption 'where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, ... or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Id., citing Gade v. National Solid
Wastes Management Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998

35

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 10

606 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vo1.28:571

thy's community property interest in the pension plan benefits
and ERISA's spendthrift provision.23o The Boggs majority construed Dorothy's ownership and testamentary disposition of
her community property interest under Louisiana law as a
prohibited assignment and alienation of Isaac's pension plan
benefits in conflict with ERISA's spendthrift clause.231 The
Court reasoned that this assignment and alienation was not
excepted under the QDRO provision because Congress chose
not to accommodate testamentary transfers of pension plan
benefits under this exception.232 Due to ERISA's silence on the
issue, the Court then extended this reasoning to find that Congress implied that community property claims in the testamentary context were to be preempted because such claims were
not consistent with ERISA's statutory scheme?33
B. A COMMUNITY PROPERTY INTEREST Is A PRESENT
OWNERSHIP INTEREST NOT AN INTEREST DERIVED FROM A
PROHIBITED AsSIGNMENT OR ALIENATION

The effect of Louisiana laws governing the ownership and
testamentary disposition of the pension plan benefits in Boggs
did not constitute a prohibited "assignment or alienation" under ERISA's spendthrift provision234 and, thus, state law
should have prevailed. Under Louisiana community property
law, Dorothy possessed a present ownership interest in the
pension plan benefits at her death.235 Accordingly, her interest
was not derived from an assignment or alienation of Isaac's
pension plan benefits.236 Dorothy's community property interest passed to the sons by operation of state law and was, thus,

230. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 s. Ct. 1754, 1763-64 (1997).
231. See id.
232. See id. at 1764.
233. See id. at 1763-64.
234. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(l) (1994).
235. See T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834, 841-44, 846 (La. 1976).
The nonemployee spouse's community interest in pension plan benefits arises through
operation of state law and not as a result of an assignment or alienation from the participant spouse. See id.
236. See id.
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not transferred to them by assignment or alienation?37 The
Court, however, held to the contrary and the majority's conflict
analysis in Boggs unconstitutionally divested Dorothy of a testamentary power over a present ownership interest?38 Further, the majority failed to give deference to the fact that the
sons' inheritance became effective only after the benefits were
distributed from the pension plan and Isaac's usufruct terminated. 239 The Court allowed ERISA to continue its reign over
distributed property after ERISA's federal purpose had been
satisfied and assets properly distributed from the plan which it
controlled. 240
C. PROTECTING THE FEDERAL INTEREST - LIMITED CONFLICT
AND THE ANNUITY

The conflict in Boggs, if any, between Louisiana law and
ERISA existed only in relation to the Annuity benefits?41 The
Court did not. provide an adequate basis for its fmding of preemption because Sandra's federal rights to the Annuity could
have been protected while allowing the sons just relief under
their state law claims.242 Thus, preemption could have been
limited to the value of the Annuity benefits only?43 Where
state law offends neither general preemption nor ERISA specific preemption principles, no conflict with federal law
exists. 244 The Court's contrary holding in Boggs favoring preemption on general principles, despite the absence of state and

237. See supra notes 42-45 regarding the sons' interest under operation of Louisiana law.
238. See Brief for State of Louisiana as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
15, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 s. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79) (citing La. Civ. Code Ann. arts.
2327, 2334 and 2336).
239. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1771-72 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
240. See id. at 1775-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
241. See id. at 1774-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242. See id. at 1776 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "In sum, an annuity goes to Sandra, a
surviving spouse; but otherwise Dorothy would remain free ... to bequeath, her share
of the marital estate to her children." [d.
243. See id.
244. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979). The Hisquierdo Court
said that state law 'must do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests
before the Supremacy Clause will demand that State law be overridden." [d.; citing
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
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federal conflict, significantly impacts spousal property rights in
the nine community property states245 because it prevents state
community property rights from attaching to property which is
often the most significant asset of the community?46
The Court does not give deference to the distinction between
the concededly impermissible result of awarding the sons a distribution of a percentage of the monthly Annuity proceeds directly from the pension plan and the permissible result of providing them with other, possibly nonpension, Dorothy/lsaac
community assets of equivalent value. 247 Such an equivalent
value could have been determined pursuant to an accounting of
their mother's date of death community interest adjusted for
Isaac's usufruct. 248 On the resolution of an accounting pursuant to the sons' state law rights, Sandra could have been
awarded the Annuitl49 and the sons' claims could have been
satisfied with an award of other property of equivalent value, if
necessary and available.250 To the extent that the sons' award
would invade Sandra's share of the Annuity, and no other
property was available for its satisfaction, the sons' award relating only to the Annuity benefits would be preempted.251
Such a holding would have protected the federal interest252 and
avoided the implied result. 253
D. UNDERSTANDING LOUISIANA LAW AND THE SONS' CLAIMS

Under Louisiana law, community assets bequeathed by
Dorothy to Isaac in the form of the usufruct presumably pass

245. See supra note 134. The nine community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin.
246. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1767 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Benefits
in ERISA qualified pension plans "are often a couple's most important lifetime assets."

Id.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See id. at 1774-75.
See id.
See id. at 1774-76.
See id.
See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1774-76 (1997)(Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id. "On the assumptions I have made, to fmd a conflict in this case, one
would have to depart from what Congress actuaily said in ERISA and infer some more
abstract general purpose ..." Id.
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naked ownership to the sons on Isaac's death by operation of
state law. 254 Dorothy's bequest to Isaac vested the sons, as
heirs on her death, with a cause of action for an accounting to
value her interest on their father's death?55 Based on this accounting, the sons had a right to receive assets of equivalent
value to their mother's community interest on their father's
death, subject to his usufruct. 256
Further, Dorothy's will did not operate to transfer pension
plan benefits prior to their distribution from the pension
plan. 257 Instead, the will operated to control disposition of her
community interest upon Isaac's death after the benefits were
distributed from the plan.258 This disposition first took the
form of Isaac's lifetime usufruct. 259 Subsequently, on Issac's
death, the sons should have been awarded naked ownership of
the remaining benefits or property of equivalent value attributed to their mother's community interest as determined by an
accounting. 26o
The majority in Boggs cites an array of case law supportive
of preemption, but does not adequately recognize the distin-

254. See supra notes 4245 regarding Louisiana usufruct, naked ownership and
succession principles.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1772 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
258. See id.
See Brieffor Respondents at 18, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79).
Sandra's preemption claim is in conflict with Congress' intent and past holdings of the
Court because it ignores the distinction between the effect of state law on benefits [after
distributionl, as opposed to benefit plans. (Emphasis added.) In effect, the former
being merely a property interest after distribution in accordance with the ERISA qualified provisions of the latter. See id.
But see, Brief for Petitioner at 15, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79).
The pre-distribution/post-distribution issue represents "a distinction without a difference~ because the Fifth Circuit majority recognized the very existence of the plan when
it found that Dorothy had a community interest in the benefits on her date of death
prior to their distribution upon Isaac's retirement in 1985. The brief calls for preemption based on the argument that the Fifth Circuit majority's recognition is proof that
Louisiana's laws 'relate to' the plan under ERISA's preemption clause because the
"[slons' claims are premised on the very existence of the vel non of the Bell Plan.~ [d.
259. See supra note 42 regarding usufruct.
260. See supra notes 4245 regarding Louisiana usufruct, naked ownership and
succession principles.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998

39

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 10

610 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vo1.28:571
guished characteristics of the sons' claims.261 With the exception of Ablamis,262 the cases cited in the Court's preemption
analysis should not have been applied to resolve the dispute in
Boggs because the cited cases concern federally funded benefit
plans or programs and conflicting state law.263 The Boggs plan,
however, was privately funded with community funds. 264 Congress enacted ERISA to regulate only private employee benefit
plans and to protect participants and beneficiaries by providing
a framework for plan integrity and security in the payment of
benefits. 265
Under Louisiana community property law, funds contributed, as deferred compensation, into private benefits plans are
fruits of the labor of the community.266 On its face, the contribution of community income to fund ERISA regulated benefit
plans merely represents an investment strategy.267 Such a
strategic investment choice, however, should not alter the predictable status of property ownership under state law by subjecting the property to federal control which compels a result

261. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1759 (1997). "ERISA pre-empts a testamentary transfer by a nonparticipant spouse of her community property interest in
undistributed pension plan benefits." [d.
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979). Railroad Retirement Act benefits
cannot be divided on divorce under state community property law. See id.
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). The Supremacy Clause warrants preemption of any division of federal military pay in state divorce proceedings. See id.
Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981). The Supremacy Clause prohibits state intervention into a service member's right to designate the beneficiary of federally
funded insurance and the surviving spouse of a service member cannot enforce an
interest in federally funded insurance proceeds based on state community property
laws. See id.
Free v. Bland 369 U.S. 663 (1962). Treasury regulations providing for the survivor's
ownership in accordance with the manner in which title to U.S. savings bonds was held
to preempt conflicting state law; despite the fact that the bonds were purchased with
community funds. See id.
262. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991).
263. See supra note 261 regarding the Hisquierdo, McCarty, Ridgway cases.
264. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1767 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
265. See supra note 102 regarding ERISA's intended purposes.
266. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1996). Article 2338 states that community
property includes "property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through
the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse." [d.
267. See supra note 35 regarding tax incentives in connection with participation in
qualified benefit plans.
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inconsistent with one's testamentary scheme.268 The Court's
construction ignores the core basis of the community property
system and creates uncertain and undesirable effects for the
multitudes whose property rights it has altered?69
The majority cited the equitable nature of the REA amendments to ERISA as evidence of Congress' intent to provide a
stream of income for surviving spouses.270 A state law regulating the plan to effect payment of benefits directly to a third
party clearly frustrates the federal purpose because such a
transfer, if not a QDRO, would be a prohibited assignment or
alienation under federal law.271 Preemption would be necessary to protect the integrity of the federal legislation in this
context. 272 If this were the actual issue before the Court, the
majority would be correct in ruling for Sandra based on
ERISA's spendthrift clause.273
The sons, however, merely sought an accounting to value
their mother's community interest in the pension plan benefits
after the benefits were distributed from the pension plan.274
This distribution was in compliance with ERISA and the sons
did not request relief from the Court in the form of a direct
payment of a percentage of the monthly Annuity payments
from the plan. 275 ERISA should no longer apply to control
268. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1772, 1775 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
269. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760 (1997). "The nine community property states have some 80 million residents, with perhaps $1 trillion in retirement
plans." [d.
270. See id. at 1761.
271. See 26 CFR § 1.401(a) - 13(c)(I)(ii). An assignment and alienation has been defined as "any direct or indirect arrangement whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary" an interest enforceable against a plan to "all or any part of a plan
benefit which is, or may become, payable to the participant or beneficiary." [d.
See Brieffor Respondents at 33-39, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 9679). However, the above defmition [pursuant to 26 CFR § 1.401(a) - 13(c)(l)(ii») speaks
in terms of enforcement against a plan and applies to benefits which are "payable.
(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, this defmition should not control in Boggs because
enforcement against the plan was not sought and the benefits had already been distributed in compliance with ERISA. See id.
272. See Brief for Respondents at 33-39, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No.
96-79).
273. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1770, 1774 (1997) (Breyer, dissenting).
274. See id. at 1774.
D

275. See id.
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property once it is distributed in accordance with the plan.276
The majority, however, did not give deference to the fact that
the benefits had already been duly disbursed by the pension
plan.277

E. THE FACTS OF BOGGS ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM ABLAMIS
The significant distinction between the facts of Ablamis and
Boggs is that in Boggs the plan benefits were already distributed when the state laws at issue came into operation?78 In
Ablamis, however, the benefits had yet to be distributed from
the ERISA governed benefit plan.279 The Ablamis court held
that ERISA preempted California community property laws
which otherwise gave the predeceasing nonemployee spouse a
testamentary interest in a surviving employee spouse's vested,
but undistributed, pension benefits.280 Despite this distinction,
the United States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in
Boggs and remanded the case. 281
The Ablamis reasoning relies on the Ninth Circuit's reading
of a statute and legislative record that are silent on the treatment of probate orders under the QDRO exception?82 The silence in this regard could imply that probate orders are outside
the scope of the QDRO exception and, therefore, are not excepted. 283 Conversely, this legislative silence could imply that
probate orders are outside the scope of ERISA and, therefore,
are not in conflict.284 The Ablamis majority, by implication,
extends ERISA's reach in a manner that is inconsistent with
Congress' legislative intentions by enlarging the meaning of

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See id. at 1775.
See id. at 1761.
See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (1997).
See id. at 1759.
See id.
See id. at 1767.
See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F. 2d 1450, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1991) (Fletcher, J.,

dissenting). State marital property laws do not conflict with ERISA and the statute as
written by Congress "cannot be read as creating the testamentary disenfranchisement
of a predeceasing spouse." [d. at 1467, n.2.
283. See id. at 1462-63.

284. See id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss3/10

42

Vecino: Boggs v. Boggs

1998]

BOGGS V. BOGGS

613

REA's QDRO exception to exclude application to community
property rights in a testamentary context.285
The preemption that divested the nonparticipant spouse of
testamentary rights over the community share of pension plan
benefits in Ablamis was grounded in that court's circular reasoning. The majority assumed that because a probate order did
not fit within the statute's definition of a "qualified domestic
relations order" it could not come within the exception provided
under REA. 286 REA, however, does not expressly recognize
probate orders within the QDRO exception and, thus, should
not be read to implicitly allow for the preemption of probate
orders. 287 REA's silence with respect to testamentary rights
places state law governing such rights out of its preemptive
reach. 288 If Congress had intended preemption in such a setting, then it would have expressly provided for such treatment
under REA. 289
The REA amendment provides an exception to ERISA's
spendthrift provision and recognizes state community property
law only in the divorce context and only to the extent that a
division of marital assets is based on community property principles as reflected in the QDRO.290 Therefore, pre-REA case
law should generally provide the proper basis for determining
the community property rights of nonparticipant spouses in a
testamentary setting. 291

285. See id. at 1460.
286. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (1994). A QDRO is dermed as "a domestic
relations order - which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right
to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits
payable with respect to a participant under a plan ... " Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (1994). A QDRO is exempt from ERISA's spendthrift provision. See id.
287. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (1994).
288. See 130 CONGo REC. H 875 (1984). Rep. Erlenborn's statement that REA was
not intended to "derme or restrict the marital property interest in retirement benefits
as determined under state law." Id.
289. See supra notes 148-59.
290. See id.
291. For cases decided before the enactment of REA, see In Re Marriage of Campa,
89 Cal. App. 3d 113 (1979), cert. denied sub nom., Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v.
Campa, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (the nonparticipant spouse's rights in and to pension plan
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F. ALTERING THE SPHERE OF TRADITIONAL STATE LEGISLATIVE
CONCERN

The state laws at issue here are family, property and probate. 292 These areas traditionally occupy the sphere of state
legislative concern293 and may be superseded only if Congress
has clearly expressed an intention to legislate within those areas. 294 Congress enacted ERISA to regulate private pension
plans and not to alter an individual's state granted property
rights. 295 In Boggs, Louisiana laws allowing for the sons' inheritance should not be preempted under proper analysis focused on the language and intended purpose of ERISA's preemption provision because the state laws do not "relate to" a
regulated plan. 296 A state law "relate[sl to" an ERISA regulated plan within the meaning of the federal preemption provision where it expressly refers to or has a connection with such
a plan. 297 The Louisiana laws at issue in Boggs were not

benefits are not barred by ERISA's spendthrift provision because they do not constitute
a transfer within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) and the appeal was dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds for want of a substantial federal question).
See United Ass'n. of Journeyman v. Myers, 488 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. La. 1980). Louisiana's community property laws were not preempted by ERISA's spendthrift provision because community property rights are essentially ownership rights and not
transfers under state law, thus precluding the fmding of an unlawful assignment or
alienation in violation of ERISA. The court used state law marital property characterization due to ERISA's silence on the matter and concluded that, in the absence of Congress' express intent to control, state community property rights must prevail. See id.
292. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1770 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). "I
cannot say that the state law at issue here concerns a subject that Congress wished to
place outside the State's legal reach ... the state law in question involves family, property, and probate - all areas of traditional, and important, state concern." [d.
293. See id.
294. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977). Congress' intent
to legislate within a particular sphere reflects intent to preempt all state laws in that
field regardless of whether or not the effective enactments expressly prohibit all state
legislation within that area oflegislative concern. See id.
295. See supra note 102 regarding ERISA's intended purposes.
296. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1,7, 15 (1987). In refusing to
preempt state law and distinguishing between state laws that regulate employee benefit plans and those that provide for a system of benefit distribution after the funds are
paid out, the Court stated that the state law"... fails to implicate the regulatory concerns of ERISA itself ... because "ERISA's pre-emption provision does not refer to state
laws relating to 'employee benefits' but to state laws relating to 'employee benefit plans .
. .... (Emphasis added.) [d.
297. See California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
117 S. Ct. 832, 837 (1997).
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within the scope of ERISA's preemption prOVISIOn because
those laws do not refer to ERISA regulated employee benefit
plans. 298 These state laws instead refer to property rights.299
Further, the Louisiana laws preempted in Boggs did not have a
prohibited connection with an ERISAplan. 30o These state laws
instead have a connection with distributed benefits. 30l Additionally, state community property and succession laws are not
legislative fields which Congress has historically sought to occupy.302 Thus, it follows that state law operations within those

298. See id.
N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677-78 (1995)
(Souter, J., analyzing ERISA's preemption clause, and in particular, the meaning of the
'relate to' phrase within ERISA's preemption provision). "We simply must go beyond
the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of deflning its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that
Congress understood would survive." [d.
Justice Souter concluded that Congress intended to avoid a multitude of indirectly
conflicting state regulation and provide national uniformity with respect to the administration of employee beneflt plans. (Emphasis added.) See id. at 1680, 1683.
299. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2325 (West 1996). Article 2325 states that a matrimonial regime creates a system of property ownership and management between
married persons and toward third persons. See id.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2338 (West 1996). Article 2338 states that community property includes "property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the
effort, skill, or industry of either spouse ... " [d.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2336 (West 1996). Article 2336 states "each spouse owns a
present undivided one-half interest in the community property." [d.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 535 (West 1996). Article 535 states that: "Usufruct is a real
right of limited duration on the property of another. The features of the right vary
with the nature of the things subject to it as consumables or nonconsumables." [d.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 538 (West 1996). Article 538 states that, at the termination
of the usufruct, the usufructuary [holder of the usufructl of a consumable is "bound to
pay the naked owner either the value that the things had at the commencement of the
usufruct or deliver to him things of the same quantity or quality." [d.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 478 (West 1996). Article 478 states: "The ownership of a
thing burdened with a usufruct is designated as naked ownership." [d.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 477 (West 1996). Article 477 states: "Ownership is the right
that confers on a person direct, immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing. The
owner of a thing may use, enjoy, and dispose of it within the limits and under conditions established by law." [d.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 940 (West 1996). Article 940 states: "A succession is acquired by the legal heir, who is called by law to the inheritance, immediately after the
death of the deceased person to whom he succeeds." [d.
300. See California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
117 S. Ct. 832, 838 (1997).
301. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1770 (1997).
302. See id. at 1761. The Court stated "[nlor need we consider the applicability of
fleld pre-emption ... " [d.
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fields should not be subject to preemption on the alternative
theory offield preemption or otherwise.303
The Louisiana laws at issue provide for the testamentary
distribution of community property derived from whatever
source within the constitutional parameters of the state's police
power. 304 As a general matter, once property is distributed to
the domicilliary of a state from a federally regulated pension
plan state law becomes operative and may affect the subsequent disposition of the distributed property.305 For example,
state income tax is owed on distributed benefits and state law
may proscribe certain uses of the distributed benefits as
fraudulent. 306
In sum, ERISA should not control an estate distribution
through preemption of state community property and succes-

303. See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978). A state law will be
preempted if it is within a legislative field which Congress has sought to occupy. See
id.
304. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." Id.
See T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834, 841-44, 846 (La. 1976). Pension plan benefits are community property. See id.
305. See Brief for State of Louisiana as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
6-7, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754' (1997) (No. 96-79). Stating, with regard to preemption by ERISA that:
A workable bright-line rule is this: state law has no application until
pension funds are distributed out of the pension plan since the purpose
of ERISA is to assure that plans are well administered by fiduciaries
who are freed from interference from state orders and state law claims.
Once funds are distributed, state law fully attaches. State income tax
is owed. State law defining what is a fraudulent use of the funds applies. All aspects of state property law apply. The same bright-line test
applies to the anti-alienation section of ERISA. Plan administrators
are to ignore instructions ... to pay benefits to some third party (such
as a creditor). However, once funds are distributed, they may be used
[in a manner that could be termed an alienation under federal regulation]. Under'this sensible bright-line rule, the timing of an alienation
document is irrelevant under ERISA so long as it has no impact on pension plan administrators and no effect in rem on pension funds until
they fall under the control of state property law after distribution.
Id.
N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross v. Travelers Ins., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995)
(state surcharges imposed on employee health care plans do not 'relate to'
employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA's preemption clause).
306. See Brief for State of Louisiana as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
6-7, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997) (No. 96-79).
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sion laws once its federal purposes are met by direct payment
of the plan benefits to the participant or the designated beneficiary.307 Congress has expressed no intention that ERISA supersede state family, property and probate laws on such
facts.3OB The Court's holding despite these legislative deficiencies usurps the state laws at issue in Boggs and unconstitutionally preempts the ownership rights of Dorothy and the
sons. 309
VII.

PRACTICAL ESTATE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The Boggs decision raises some significant questions for professionals planning estates that include community property
and community property rights. 310 Unfortunately, the holding
does not provide definitive answers to some of the significant
questions' it raises. 3ll These questions primarily involve the
use of the unified credie 12 and the marital deduction313 for estate tax purposes. 314 Although a thorough discussion of the
federal estate tax ramifications is beyond the scope of this
Note, consideration is given to the basic estate planning and
tax issues arising from the pervasive impact of Boggs. Accordingly, this section will focus on the basic estate planning
and federal estate tax inquiries and the apparent answers
flowing from the Boggs decision. 315

307. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 s. Ct. 1754, 1775-76 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
308. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text regarding Congress' intent that
ERISA supersede" state law.
309. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1776 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
310. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 683 (1997).
311. See id. at 683-85.
312. See I.R.C. § 2010 (1997). This Code section provides for the unified credit
amount against estate tax. The applicable credit amount is the amount of the tentative
tax determined under the rate schedule set forth in I.R.C. 2001(c) (1997). See id.
I.R.C. § 2505 (1997). This Code section provides for the unified credit to be applied
against estate tax. See id.
313. See I.R.C. § 2056 (1997). This Code section provides for the marital deduction,
which permits a husband and wife to transfer unlimited amounts to each other without
federal estate or gift tax consequences on the death of the first spouse. See id.
314. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997).
315. See infra notes 316-70 and accompanying text.
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A. THE UNIFIED CREDIT AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY ESTATE
PLANNING
Though a degree of uncertainty exists,316 the holding in
Boggs 317 appears to adversely limit the use of the unified credit
in community property states.318 Available to each taxpayer
only once, the unified credit is a credit against gift and estate
tax levied on inter vivos gifts and death transfers.319 This
credit can be aggregated on a rolling basis until the total limit
is reached. 320 The unified credit against gift and estate tax is
currently $202,050 for decedents dying in 1998, which is the
equivalent of tax imposed on taxable gift transfers totaling
$625,000.321 Thus, as a practical matter, this credit allows for
an individual tax shelter of $625,000 worth of taxable giftS?22
Proper planning utilizing a combination of techniques allows a
married couple to transfer a total of $1,250,000 worth of gifts
tax free. 323 The most basic combination of spousal estate planning techniques commonly used in community property states
are the bypass trust and inter vivos giftS.324

316. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997).
317. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
318. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997).
319. See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, MARTIN B. DICKINSON, JR. AND WILLIAM J. TuRNIER,
TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 35 (19th ed., CCH Inc. 1994).
320. See id. at 127.
I.R.C. § 2010 (1997). This Code section provides for the unified credit amount
against estate tax. The applicable credit amount is the amount of the tentative tax
determined under the rate schedule set forth in I.R.C. 2001(c) (1997). See id.
I.R.C. § 2505 (1997). This Code section provides for the unified credit to be applied
against estate tax. See id.
321. See I.R.C. 2010 (1997) and I.R.C. 2505 (1997).
322. See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, MARTIN B. DICKINSON, JR. AND WILLIAM J. TURNIER,
TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 127-29 (19th ed., CCH Inc. 1994). The
author of this Note has adjusted the amount of the tax shelter referenced in the text
above to conform with the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which amended I.R.C. 2010 and
I.R.C. 2505.
323. See id.
324. See id.
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The bypass trust is primarily designed to take full advantage of each spouse's unified credit against estate tax.325 The
decedent's personal representative must take care not to make
a QTIP election under I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) with respect to the
property left to fund the bypass trust so that the predeceasing
spouse's unified credit can be used to offset any tax imposed on
the property left to this trust. 326 If, however, there is no property to fund the bypass trust, the estate plan will fail and all
marital property will be taxed on the survivor's death without
the offset of the predeceasing spouse's unified credit.327 Further, the estate tax liability is increased because the marital
property could not be split to take advantage of the progressive
tax rate scheme.328
The Boggs 329 holding may prevent the effective implementation of the bypass trust in community property states by excluding the value of any pension plan assets from the estate of
a predeceasing nonparticipant spouse.330 Because such funds
often constitute the largest asset of a married couple, the exclusion of the value of these funds from the estate of the predeceasing nonparticipant spouse may prevent the bypass trust
from being funded. 331 The failure of the bypass trust estate
plan results in an increased taxable estate on the death of the
survivor because the predeceasing spouse lacked sufficient assets to use the unified credit and the progressive tax rates to
full advantage. 332

325. See id. This vehicle is commonly known as the bypass trust because, in the
case of a married couple with assets sufficient to cause estate tax concerns, it ultimately offers a credit shelter for the surviving spouse beneficiary. See id.
326. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997).
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
330. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997).
331. See id.
332. See KATHRYN A. BALLSUN AND ANNE K HILKER, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE
VOL. 1110-13 (Continuing Education ofthe Bar-California 1997).
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B. THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY
ESTATE PLANNING

Despite the apparent exclusion in Boggs of a community
interest in ERISA plan benefits from the predeceasing nonparticipant spouse's taxable gross estate, inclusion of such an interest would allow it to pass tax free to the surviving participant spouse under the unlimited marital deduction.333 This
deduction may also be utilized in the case of a predeceasing
participant spouse with respect to the transfer of the benefits
to the nonparticipant spouse.334 If however, on the death of the
first spouse, this is the only credit or deduction taken, the surviving spouse's estate would be taxed without the benefit of the
marital deduction and with only the survivor's unified credit
available. 335
C. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE EFFECT OF THE BYPASS TRUST:

The bypass trust is designed to provide income to the beneficiary spouse for life with the corpus in trust for the children
or third parties so that at the death of the surviving spouse, the
assets of the bypass trust are not includable in the surviving
spouse's gross estate. 336 This technique is an effective planning
tool utilized to avoid or mitigate the tax liability of married
couples with assets sufficient to raise estate tax concerns on
the death of the surviving spouse.337 In the full credit situation, the use of a bypass trust excludes the taxation of $625,000
(the tax shelter amount under the unified credit) of assets on
the death of the first spouse after December 31, 199r38 by al-

333. See I.R.C. § 2056 (1997). This Code section provides for the marital deduction,
which permits a husband and wife to transfer unlimited amounts to each other without
federal estate or gift tax consequences on the death of the first spouse. See id.
334. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 684-685 (1997).
335. See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, MARTIN B. DICKINSON, JR. AND WILLIAM J. TURNIER,
TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 127-29 (19th ed., CCH Inc. 1994).
336. See KATHRYN A. BALLSUN AND ANNE K HILKER, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE
VOL. 1110-13 (Continuing Education of the Bar-California 1997).
337. See id. at 110.
338. See I.R.C. § 2010 (1997). This Code section provides for the unified credit
amount against estate tax. The applicable credit amount is the amount of the tentative
tax determined under the rate schedule set forth in I.R.C. 2001(c) (1997). See id.
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lowing that predeceased spouse's unified credit to offset the tax
imposed on the property transferred to the trust.339 Assuming
that the trust is administered properly and generates sufficient
income without significant gain in value, the surviving spouse
can use the income but transfer the trust principal, as well as
his or her own estate, tax free at death.340 By naming the surviving spouse as the beneficiary of the bypass trust, a terminable interest is created. 341 Thus, the assets of the trust are not
includable in the estate of the surviving spouse because the
surviving spouse's interest is essentially a life estate terminable on death.342 Accordingly, the unified credit of the predeceasing spouse is fully utilized and tax on the transfer of the
excess to the surviving spouse is avoided under the marital deduction and the marital assets will consequently bypass the
survivor's estate. 343 In a situation where one spouse's property
interests are substantially larger than the other spouse's, an
inter vivos gift can be used to equalize the estates and maximize use of the credit. 344
The following simplified, but illustrative, scenarios assume
a textbook example marital gross estate of $1,250,000 to demonstrate the effect of the bypass trust.345 The first scenario assumes that no bypass trust was in place and that the married
couple decided, on the death of the first spouse, to only take
See I.R.C. § 2505 (1997). This Code section provides for the unified credit to be applied against estate tax. See id.
See I.R.C. § 2001(c) provides the rate schedule to be used in detennining the tentative tax on the applicable exclusion amount. See id.
339. See KATHRYN A. BALLSUN AND ANNE K HILKER, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE
VOL. 1110-13 (Continuing Education of the Bar-California 1997).
340. See id.
341. See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, MARTIN B. DICKINSON, JR. AND WILLIAM J. TURNIER,
TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 660-62 (19th ed., CCH Inc. 1994).
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD, MARTIN B. DICKINSON, JR. AND WILLIAM J. TURNIER,
TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS AND TRUSTS 127-29 (19th ed., CCH Inc. 1994).
345. See id. The simplified scenario discussed in the text above assumes that no
QTIP election with respect to trust property is made by the predeceasing spouse's personal representative under I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7). It also assumes no significant appreciation of the assets of the surviving spouse's personal representative held outside of the
trust. The author of this Note has adjusted all values referenced in the text above to
confonn to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the Tax Payer Relief Act of
1997.
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advantage of the marital deduction. 346 Accordingly, because of
the marital deduction, the entire community property estate of
$1,250,000 is transferred outright to the survivor free of tax.347
The estate of the survivor, however, will be subject to federal
estate tax upon his or her death because the survivor will be
able to take advantage of only his or her unified credit.348
Thus, assuming no significant appreciation or depreciation, the
survivor's taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes is
$1,250,000. 349 The unified credit will preclude tax on $625,000
and the remaining $625,000 will be subject to federal estate
tax. 350
In the second scenario, assume that a bypass trust is funded
on the death of the first spouse.351 This technique will direct
$625,000 to be transferred to a bypass trust for the surviving
spouse's benefit during his or her life, with the remainder interest in the trust for the benefit of the spouses' children or
third parties. 352 . Thus, on the death of the first spouse, no federal estate tax is due on the $625,000 tax shelter amount because of the use of the unified credit and the amount transferred in excess of the $625,000 in trust qualifies for the marital deduction. 353 The amount in excess of $625,000 passes outright to the surviving spouse and, assuming no significant appreciation of the assets transferred, will not be taxed on the
survivor's death due to the availability of the unified credit.354
If the assets appreciate, only the amount in excess of $625,000
is subject to federal estate tax because of the availability of the
unified credit.355 This results in no taxable estate on the death
of the survivor because his or her taxable estate does not in-

346. See KATHRYN A. BALLSUN AND ANNE K HILKER, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE
VOL. 1110-13 (Continuing Education of the Bar-California 1997).
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. See KATHRYN A. BALLSUN AND ANNE K HILKER, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE
VOL. 1 110-13 (Continuing Education of the Bar-California 1997).
352. See id.
353. See id.
354. See id.
355. See id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss3/10

52

Vecino: Boggs v. Boggs

1998]

BOGGS V. BOGGS

623

elude the assets of the bypass trust as this interest is only a life
interest terminable at death.356 Thus, the use of the bypass
trust eliminates estate tax on both spouse's estates.357
Boggs 358 may thwart the effectiveness of this plan within
community property states because it prohibits a predeceasing
nonparticipant spouse from having a testamentary power over
a community property interest in qualified pension plan benefits. 359 Thus, the Boggs holding prevents a credit from being
taken on assets in or distributed from employee benefit
plans. 36o Because these benefits are usually the largest asset of
the community, the effectiveness of the bypass technique is
jeopardized for many married couples unless there are other
significant community assets.361 If no other significant community assets exist, the trust cannot be funded and all of the
marital assets may be taxed on the death of the surviving
spouse. 362

D. THE IRA AND THE UNIFIED CREDIT
Boggs may also prevent IRA funds from being similarly
used in connection with estate planning goals designed to take
maximum advantage of the unified credit.363 This appears true
to the extent that the source of the assets used to fund the IRA
can be traced to ERISA benefits.364 The Boggs decision overrules at least one California Supreme Court holding by not recognizing IRA funds as community property.365 This treatment
by the Boggs Court further limits the options available to make

356. See KATHRYN A. BALLSUN AND ANNE K HILKER, ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE
VOL. 1110-13 (Continuing Education of the Bar-California 1997).
357. See id.
358. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
359. See id. at 1762-64.

360. See id.
361. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997).

362. See id.
363. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs v. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997).
364. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1764 (1997).
365. See Estate of MacDonald, 794 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1990). The assets in an IRA
were held to be community property. See id.
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effective use of taxpayer credits by removing another significant asset from the available pool of community resources.366

E. THE RETURN OF THE TERMINABLE INTEREST RULE
The Boggs decision also appears to trigger the return of the
terminable interest rule367 because it does not allow for a predeceasing nonparticipant spouse's testamentary power over a
community interest in undistributed benefits in the surviving
participant spouse's ERISA benefit plan.368 Thus, a community
interest under state law is not to be included in the predeceasing nonparticipant spouse's gross estate for federal tax purposes and the value otherwise attributed to this interest is not
subject to estate tax. 369 The surviving participant spouse, however, will likely face increased estate tax liability as a result of
this transfer, unless estate planning techniques control this
property's taxable exposure.370
VII.

PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS

The impact of Boggs significantly affects the community
property system by creating uncertainty among estate planning attorneys and participants and beneficiaries who may now
need to amend or abandon their estate plans.371 It alters the
predictable state community property and succession rights in
a manner that was not foreseen and on which participants and
beneficiaries in community property states have not been con-

366. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685 (1997).
367. See id. at 684. Most believe that California repealed the terminable interest
rule in 1986 pursuant to the repeal of I.R.C. § 2039(c) in that same year. The change
required the predeceasing nonparticipant spouse's community interest in the survivor's
benefits to be included in the predeceasing spouse's gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes in situations where the nonparticipant predeceased the participant. The
terminable interest rule now seems applicable only in cases involving a predeceased
nonparticipant spouse. See id.
368. See id.
369. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 684 (1997).
370. See id.
371. See id.
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clusively heard through their elected representatives.372 The
Boggs holding creates uncertainty for attorneys in community
property states to properly advise clients on estate planning
strategy because it is an overly broad judicial solution on a
unique set of facts. 373 The issues presented in Boggs, however,
are worthy of and require a detailed legislative resolution.374 A
legislative resolution enacted to provide clarity, predictability
and guidance as to ERISA's relation to the community property
and testamentary rights of participants, spouse's and beneficiaries is needed. 375 Such a solution requires Congress to recognize the impact of the Boggs decision and, if desired, preempt
its effects after due consideration based on detailed fmdings
throughout the process.376
One proposed solution would be to clarify ERISA's preemption provision so that it expressly excepts state community
property and succession laws that do not directly regulate
ERISA governed pension plans. This would allow for the state
law testamentary disposition of benefits after distribution from
the employee benefit plan. Another proposal is to further
amend ERISA's spendthrift provision to either include probate
orders under the QDRO exception or provide for some similar
mechanism by which probate orders can qualify for an exception. Any amendment of ERISA's spendthrift clause should
also expressly recognize that a community property interest
constitutes a present ownership interest with inherent testamentary rights and not an interest derived from a prohibited
assignment or alienation. Further, any such future legislation
should give specific deference to estate planning and tax ramifica tions. 377

372. See supra notes 310-70 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 310-70 and accompanying text.
374. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.5
TAX NOTES 679, 685-86 (1997).

375. See id.
376. See id.
377. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.5
TAX NOTES 679, 686 (1997).
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IX.

CONCLUSION

Numerous cases have been filed in relation to issues of
ERISA preemption 'of various state laws.378 The Boggs case
and its extended, contested history prove that Congress needs
to clearly delineate the extent of ERISA preemption within the
testamentary context. 379 ERISA's broadly stated preemption
provision and vague spendthrift provision are inadequate due
to complexities unforeseen at the time the provisions were
drafted. 380 If the legislation is to withstand the test of constitutional validity, Congress must consider matters of which the
legislative record is void.381 Such consideration may have prevented the federal intrusion upon the state granted rights in
Boggs or, in the alternative, provided for a clear solution to
avoid unnecessary litigation.382
The Boggs Court stated that ERISA was not amenable to
the "sweeping extratextual extension,,s83 necessary to fmd implied support for the sons' claims, but failed to act on its own
advice regarding implied reasoning and held in favor of Sandra
by broad implication to the contrary.384 In essence, the Court
decided what Congress would do if it were to legislate on this
specific issue and ignored the fact that Congress has taken no
action to definitively address the specific issue of ERISA preemption of a predeceasing nonparticipant spouse's community
property rights. 385 Such a solution rarely forms the basis for
sound future legal application because it often creates no logi378. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARY. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 59 n.l06
(Winter, 1996). Over 3,000 cases have been filed in the courts in relation to issues of
ERISA preemption of state laws.
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 117 S. Ct.
832 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). "Since ERISA was enacted in 1974, this Court has
accepted certiorari in, and decided, no less than 14 cases to resolve conflicts ... regarding ERISA pre-emption of various sorts of state law." Id.
379. See Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996), affg, 849 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. La.
1994), reu'd, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
380. See supra notes 103-33, 148-59 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 103-33, 148-59 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 224-309 and accompanying text.
383. Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1765 (1997).
384. See id. at 1776 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
385. See id.
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cal and conclusive rule designed for uniform application.386
The majority's holding is one way to theoretically provide uniform regulation, but legislative solutions can better provide for
proper and consistent future treatment where such sensitive
and traditional state interests as community property and succession rights are involved.387
In particular, a legislative solution will allow the significantly numerous population of plan participants and beneficiaries domiciled in community property states to have their concerns conclusively determined through the legislative process.
Accordingly, the consensus of those whose property rights in
pension benefits are adversely affected by the Boggs holding
may provide for the desired level of protection of, what is to
many, the most valuable economic asset of life's labor.

Tony Vecino*

386. See id.
387. See Philip H. Wile, Boggs u. Boggs: The Good News and the Bad News, 76 No.
5 TAX NOTES 679, 685-86 (1997).
* Golden Gate University, Class of 1999. I wish to express my gratitude to all
those who contributed their editorial support to the publication of this Note.
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